Developing & Understanding Emotions

It is most interesting to try and understand our ever-evolving emotional life through the lens of a child’s cognitive developmental process. Michael Lewis’s account on The Emergence of Human Emotions and Paul L. Harris’s account on Understanding Emotions brings to our investigatory table some very interesting arguments, on which I would like to elaborate.

The emotional elicitor is argued to be either a learned function of how to behave or a natural process whereby specific events elicit specific emotions.  A problematic one would encounter with trying to define an emotional elicitor, is the difficulty of trying to determine which stimuli is an emotional trigger. Can there ever be a satisfactory definition for the interplay of external/internal world of emotions without generalizing? The idea that the same emotion can be provoked by different elicitors and that different emotions can be triggered by the same elicitor; is it not a generalization of something very individually determined? Further the dilemma is raised weather an emotional elicitor is internal or external, the state or the experience, the everlasting dilemma of body versus mind. This I think is only solvable by accepting the view that each enhances and influences the other. Biologically determined and also learned in the very beginning of life, in other words, cognition as mediator of elicitors. He moves forth to determine specific emotional states: The ‘non-state’ theory is most interesting to me, the common idea that ‘its all in our head’ and that generally emotions are a consequence of thought. Then the idea that we develop the emotion through appraising it should make one question our appraisal tool - language. Is the word we have acquired for the feeling broad enough to express all its different states? (E.g. love can be experienced so differently and yet it is the same word we use to describe: maternal, paternal, romantic etc.)  The other view, since Darwin, is that of a specific emotional states which then must correspond with the body; the interaction between specific emotions and the felt experience with the correspondent body is necessary; And it is true I believe that we store our emotional weight in the body. As I understand it we need to be able to verbalize the experience, to understand the general or specific emotional state one undergoes.

If the infant has not yet acquired language to express the ‘I’ experience of a certain emotional elicitor or an emotional state, does it mean the actual experience is lesser or non-existent?  For example In the experiment conducted on ‘Social evaluation by preverbal infants’ that measured the ability of the child to engage in complex social situation as a third ‘objective’ party, with only 6-10 month old infants, the findings show that early on we evolve social empathetic feelings. Lewis would have argued that infants do not even experience emotions prior to 7-8 month.  Lewis raises the complex idea that an emotional state can be experienced without consciously experiencing it. How can an individual ‘experience’ anger without experiencing it? As noted in psychotherapy these states can be brought about to consciousness, but I want to ask, where do these emotions go? Where is the subconscious storing them? And how come they can be brought about from unconscious to consciousness? The idea that a child is simply not feeling ‘self-conscious evaluative emotions’ because its sense of self in the face of the world is not yet evolved, seems different then the subconscious emotions experienced by adults, but I wonder if it really is? As Darwin said these unique emotions are what makes us human; is the infant then not fully a human until three years of age? As said that by the age of 3 years our emotions become differentiated, an elaborate and complex system of emotions will have evolved. (But don’t the bipolar infant state follow us throughout our life? Aren’t the emotions most intensely felt when in one extreme or the other?) Once we are capable of self-analyzing our emotional state, certain emotions which would be a result of an external social stimuli, are still not physically felt. Therefore I wonder does the protection mechanism in our body stop the chemical reaction that occurs in the brain from affecting the body, or the less likely option that there is no response at all?

I do agree, “…the most likely explanation of emotional development is the differentiation of emotion state which occur as a function of maturation, socialization, and cognitive development” (Lewis). Yet it is a very tricky approach as in early childhood the basic emotions seem to be felt most purely by the developing human—without the social construct of appropriation—these seem to be the innate features on the basis of which the learned script of emotions develops. Yet we have no concrete internal data to determine weather our external evaluations are correct, or vice versa.

In Paul L. Harris’s account we move form the development of emotion to the coherent understanding of emotion, the child moves from differentiation to the appraisal of his/her emotional life. It is indeed due to our specialty in language that differentiates us from other primates, as we can put our feelings into words. As said can words ever be sufficient to express the emotional experience?  It is through children that we can assess most precisely how the emotion is affected by developing cognition, as it is assumed that although they begin to put their feelings into words it is not done in a self-conscious manner as evaluative adults would. Then indeed the question arises as Harris asks: ‘to what extent are children able to offer not just a report but an accurate report of emotions?’ With the rise in vocabulary and understanding of the self in relation to the other, children begin to be able to assess their own emotions and others, in social situations with peers and family (ages 3-5). It is important to remember the individual as a measure of emotion, because some children may naturally be more empathetic then others. Moreover is it interesting to me that the familial discussion and openness about felt emotions and why one is feeling such emotions, will affect the ability of the child to appropriate social interactions. Language, which enables the child to formulate a narrative of the emotional life, makes it possible to discuss and share emotionally charged experiences. Yet I feel words can sometimes also confine us to the ‘script’ of feelings we are taught to express, and I wonder if it is at all possible to understand feelings without words? Like the example of understanding what people feel without talking to them, but merely through observation of facial expressions and body language. I think one can get to the core of very true feelings more so then often times with words as intermediaries. This is because language and cognition enable us to deceive, and how often do we recon someone is feeling quite differently then what they express in words. On the other hand conversation about emotions can be a positive sharing of attitudes, and hopefully can make sense of the appraisal processes that underpin it. Children with high emotional intelligence and verbal ability might understand the specific appraisal process relevant in a certain emotional states. The other side argues that children might be more sensitive to the non-verbal signals, and can detect a fake smile from a genuine one or a look of surprise from fear. The finding that emotional expression is related to popularity makes total sense here. Further early on and universally children can understand that the emotional reaction with its intensity is in reaction to an immediate situation; nevertheless is the power of the mind and memory capable to recreate emotions. This is an overwhelming discovery in ones own mental assessment. As mentioned by Harris, the script concept reveals a conceptual difficulty that the same situation can elicit different emotions (just as Lewis notes about the correlation of elicitor and emotional state) this script is argued to begin with an inherently psychological event, of a person appraising a situation. In children it is argued, they realize early on that it is in the match of goals and desires with the expected outcome that triggers strong emotions. Later on they begin to formulate the actuality of their beliefs and expectations as emotional stimulators. And as concluded, children’s developing understanding of the process of emotions, is an epiphenomenon!

I feel as though we are in a vicious circle with the ever determining questions such as: are the emotions innate or part of our natural developmental process as human beings; if it is the latter, is it maturational or interactive? I think that our lexicon of words is to banal to express the internal complexities of our emotions. If the emotional experiences occur on different conscious levels, what if there are such deep emotions that we cannot feel because we have no name for them hence no experience of their existence and so we never understand them consciously? 

The idea that infants are not capable of experiencing emotions up to a certain point brings up many questions. Would abortion be seen in a different light if there were a certainty that the fetus did not feel a thing? And how come the emotional state of a mother during her pregnancy can affect the child’s future character? How come there are studies that show that in our infancy, in the attachment period, our basic trust in people is evolved; As well as many other subconscious developments in our emotional world that will accompany us throughout our life?  There must be a distinction between the experience of an emotion and the rationalization of it. Even when we do not understand we have hunches within us that will make us curious to understand the ‘I’ experience in the first place, then when we have learned words to express our states of being it still seems insufficient and self disguisable.

 

 

 

 

AAI

This week’s reading was so incredibly dense that it is hard to decide on a focus or specific place to start for a discussion. I feel like these readings could produce weeks of discussion and topics! I have decided to look at the AAI used in both Seigel and Harris. My understanding is that the Adult Attachment Interview is an interview given to adults to understand the attachment they had to their parents in early childhood. It is fascinating to me that this could so clearly predict the attachment the child of these parents will have to them and what this says about the child’s emotional development.
According to Harris, the “coherence and degree of reflection with which a child’s mother talked about her own attachment was a predictor of later performance by her child on the assessment of emotion understanding.” (pg. 284) Harris also states that the children were tested on situations to the extent in which they could provoke a mixture of positive and negative feelings.
Harris then offers two interpretations of this AAI study. The first is according to attachment theory and says that the mother’s coherence and sensitivity will help in secure attachment with the child that will then foster the child’s understanding of emotion. The second interpretation is based in the theory that family talk about emotion will facilitate a child’s open expression, communication and acknowledgment of emtotion. (284)
It seems to me that these two can co-exist and actually fit together quite nicely. It would seem that a caregiver who has a coherence and sensitivity in regards to emotion will be more capable of and more likely to talk to their child about emotion. Also, understanding and being more comfortable with emotional expression themselves, it seems not too far fetched to say that they would be better able to interperate and understand the childs non-verbal expression of emotion and be more responsive to that. This responsivity seems to me to be a form of non-verbal talk. So, with a caregiver who has a more cohesive sense of emotion, there would be both more “talk” and more secure attachment. With this secure attachment and better emotional understanding, this child is more likely to have a secure attachment with their future children. It seems to be a continuing cycle.
This brings us to the Siegal article on several points. First, verbal or non-verbal “talk” could be seen as the “collaborative interpersonal interaction” that Siegal mentions as the key to healthy development (Siegal, 72). It is this interpersonal connection, found in secure attachment, that the circuits regulating emotional and social functioning are ingrained. Development is about the creation of specific circuits. (73) So it follows that interpersonal relationships are key to development.
Second, Siegal also discusses the transfer of trauma across generations (88). Integration is key in all respects to Siegals understanding of emotion and emotional experience. He suggests here that psychotherapeutic interventions would promote neural integration and promote better self-regulation and a coherent self-understanding. AAI, it seems, could be said as testing for internal integration.
Following from all of this it seems that attachment theories and talk theories do not contradict one another but are pieces of the larger answer.


Question:
Have any of the topics in this weeks reading addressed parents that are not biological? Has the AAI test been given to caregives who are not biological parents for example?
It seems to me that this would tell us a good deal about how emotions develop. Could it be that past traumatic responses in our genetic histories affect the way we develop emotion or is it totally a result of our social interactions with our parents.
This weeks readings also address the development of some attachments before birth, such as a mothers smell. Does it cause emotional stress for the child to be separated from this prenatal connection? Then the Hamlin reading addresses the elements of what may cause distress at the separation of mother and child. It seems that many of the elements mentioned in the Hamilin reading would not be problematic with a parent who adopted but the prenatal attachments could cause problems.

2-22 Emotional States, Experience, Attachment

Suzanne Ardanowski

2-22-08

Feeling Brain

 

 

            The Lewis article raised some questions for me. To think this through, let me put down on paper his ideas on emotional states first.  Emotional states are “particular constellations of changes in somatic and/or neurophysiological activity” (267).  Changes in body, face, voice, hormones occur which one may or may not be able to perceive.  He sites Elkman and says that while some have argued for correspondence between internal states and emotion, proof of specific states tied to specific emotions is lacking, with the exception of some bodily and facial expression (p.268).    There are then the cognitive nonstate theorists, who believe emotions are a result of thinking. The fear response is given as an example of a specific state, elicited by a certain stimulus. Shame is an example of cognitive processing resulting in an emotion. My first question is then when he says “cognitive” does he necessarily mean conscious?  Lewis states, “it may be quite possible to have a specific emotional state but to be unaware of it, ignore it, or even deny it” (p.268).  In saying this is he saying unconscious emotions only occur in emotional states, and not cognitively?  The cognitive emotions seem to be more complex-such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, envy, pride. Is he suggesting these “cognitive emotions” can never be unconscious? Psychoanalytic theory would say otherwise.

He does address psychoanalytic theory, discussing unconscious functions, and how conscious perceptions of experiences can be unavailable.  However, this is dependent on the experience of an internal state (p.273).  Is the unconscious therefore linked to neurophysiological activity?  Freud had wanted to prove this. Cognitively speaking, states are really cognitive constructions of experience, past history, and the responses of others. While I believe in the power of cognition, I have a hard time separating unconscious influences from cognitive experience. Though I did think the passage on the spinal injury patients was fascinating. Without access to a neurophysiological state they were able to have a sexual experience-giving strength to the argument of cognition and the ability of the human brain to use past knowledge to construct an experience. But is sexual experience the same as emotional? They could overlap, but not necessarily….I guess it depends on your definition of emotional experience.

            The experience of emotion is said to “require that the organism posses some fundamental cognitive abilities, including the ability to perceive and discriminate, recall, associate, and compare. Emotional experiences also require a particular cognitive ability-that is the development of a concept of self” (p.273). So, does that mean that animals and babies do not have emotional experiences? It is stated that prior to 7 or 8 months of age infants are not capable of experiencing emotions. This I cannot agree with.  I don’t see how the definition of emotional experience needs to be tied to the cognitive ability of attending to the self, and in fact how are we measuring a sense of self?  Infants have a state of oneness with their mother (in Western culture at least), but does that mean you cannot have an emotional experience in this state? There has been plenty of infant research, including studies on attachment, which give much argument to the emotional life of infants, including newborns and even prenatal.  Lewis goes on to say that infants maybe can “be in a particular emotional state and yet not experience it” (p.274). The argument for this is the comparison to the woman whose tire blows and does not experience her emotional state of fear. This is comparing apples to oranges. To me, the woman is unconsciously utilizing her defense mechanisms (in this case perhaps depnial of fear) for survival.  She also may feel the fear after she gets out of the car, when she is no longer in danger. I think it is too narrow a definition to say that an emotional state must be accompanied by self-awareness, but I can see why one would suggest this. However, the exclusion of young infants and animals does not seem right. How can we truly know whether someone has a sense of self? 15 months is given as the age of being able to “make reference to the self as having that state” (p.274). So before this infants are unaware of what they are experiencing? What about in cultures where self awareness is not valued? Is this part of their definition of experiencing emotion?

            The Hofer article addresses the attachment bond between a mother and child, which to me is an emotional experience, despite the symbiotic relationship. It is argued in psychoanalytical theory to have lasting (even lifetime) effects on behavior, personality, and experience.  The regulatory process of the mother-infant interaction and the impact of this interaction on later play and social interactions is something we have also been leaning about in the Play and Culture class. The Harris article states that as soon as children are able to talk, they begin to project feelings onto nonhuman objects, which is also a huge component of play and one of the foundations of play therapy.  Narratives as Harris suggests are also essential for understanding emotion for children, and for adults, which give credit to the powerful effects of talk therapy.

The social evaluations of the infants in the Hamlin et al article, who had “a liking for those who act cooperatively to facilitate the goals of others” (p.558) parallels the relationship between an infant and his/her mother.  A child’s appraisal of a situation is also discussed in the Harris article. I think subtle cues are essential to a child’s appraisal. I remember once I was having a heavy discussion with my brother in front of my five year old niece. We were both remaining calm but there must have been a tone to our voices that my niece picked up on because she kept running back and forth between me and my brother, giving us each hugs. I didn’t realize she was even doing that until later on, and I realized how comprehension is not always essential to appraising a situation. I also thought it was interesting in the Lewis article how he notes that we are more likely to believe as adults that certain expressions are tied to certain emotions depending on the context.  He gives the example of saying a child is expressing fear when a stranger approaches, yet if a child expresses the same face when sitting next to his/her mother we will call the expression something else given the context. We see what we want to see.

             

                  

            

Language and Emotion

The role of named emotional concepts in emotional experience is really interesting. I agree with James' argument that "People describe their emotions in the language they know, and the categories of their culture undoubtedly influence the emotions they feel" (Yamaguchi, p.21). I feel that culturally unique emotions (Amae, Fago, Iajya, etc.) are in fact experienced by all cultures whether or not they are defined in language. The fact that the Japanese experience Amae positively while Americans find Amae-situations offensive (and only positive in that they have control) does not seem to be a difference in Japanese/American emotions themselves but a difference in cultural responses to a given situation. The role of language in the recognition of emotional experience seems almost deceptive because these same Americans, had Japanese been their first language/culture (and here we get into the "bilingual minds" theory), would test positively when faced with Amae-situations because their cultural responses (and not their emotional capacities) are activated/inhibited by different situations than an American from the US.

Week 5 Blog: Language, Culture, and Gender

Sylviane

The article on Amae in Japan seemed to clarify a number of the issues brought up in other readings concerning cross-cultural psychology. I was immediately intrigued after reading the description of what Amae is, for it is an emotion that I feel I can relate to and understand the meaning of despite the fact that I do not know of a word in English that conveys this feeling. I was surprised, though, that it is suggested that the provider of the help “feels good about granting the favor, either by feeling close to the requester or by gaining a sense of power.” The ladder reward was particularly unusual to me, not only because it is something I cannot relate to, but it seems to contradict the sentiments that I understood Amae to include. The section explaining the definition of Amae noted that approximate English translations of the word all have fairly negative connotations and that in Japan, Amae does not typically imply disapproval. Thus, I was fairly surprised that gaining a sense of control would be a component of the emotion. As I read further and considered the highly independent nature of culture in the United States, I felt that this may be a culturally unique aspect of the emotion. While I do not feel that certain emotions can only be experienced by individuals in certain cultures, it does seem likely that they can vary slightly simply because what is “appropriate” can vary from culture to culture.

Culture, Gender, Language

Lily Thom
Matsumoto defines culture as a sociopsychological construct that encompasses not only nationality or ethnicity but also gender and language experiences. Thus, we can look at all the articles from this week as studies in cross-cultural psychology. Barrett et al’s work from last week can provide an interesting backdrop for examining cross-cultural studies on emotion. Barrett’s concept of emotional granularity could be extended to consider cultural, or gendered granularity of emotion. In the variety of studies on language and gender what Barrett saw as mental representations of emotion may also be cultural representations. People of difference cultures, using different languages experience different emotional states or emotional intensity. This goes beyond just display rules. We see differences in brain activation, electrodermal reactions, language for emotions, and differences in expression and recognition.
Both Wager and Matsumoto approach gender as a cultural difference. The Wager study shows that men have greater brain activation in response to violence and aggression and points to enculturation as a main reason. It is interesting to compare this study to some of the many studies Matsumoto cites on cultures with varying differences in individualism, masculinity and power distance. Within cultures, these dimensions may apply very differently to men and women. For example, American culture may encourage women to sacrifice individual goals more than men. Matsumoto shows that individualism is positively correlated with intensity ratings of anger and fear. I wonder if there is a connection between this outcome and that from Wager’s study in terms of how gender and culture interconnect.
Harris et al examine language learning as both a cognitive and emotional process and introduce the “emotional context of learning” theory to explain why first languages are often more emotional than second languages. Harris et al’s work can be considered in the context of Barrett’s work on the role of memory in emotional processing. Language is deeply connected with emotional memory and context in evoking emotions. Harris et al examine the ideas that early language learning is more closely related to emotional or visceral meaning making. First languages develop simultaneous to emotional regulation systems, contributing to a deeply emotional context. However, a striking counter example is that of parents who raise children and have deeply interpersonal interactions using their second language. In such cases, this emotional context overrides the emotional context of early language.
Considering cultural or mental representations of emotion lead me again to wonder about the function of emotion, something we have only touched upon in class. Niiya et al show that humans have the capacity to experience emotions that may not be named or recognized in their own culture. Yes still we see an astounding variability in emotional experience, both within and across cultures. Niiya et al recognize that emphasizing Amae in one cultural environment serves to reinforce and strengthen the culture. Whereas in a more invidualistic culture Amae does not have a socializing function and, therefore, is not emphasized. What biological purposes do such variability and flexibility provide? How do cultural or language barriers limit this emotional range and why? What biological purpose might there be to these limitations?

I should have read the Matsumoto reading first. I read it last and then I felt the need to revisit the other articles with his work in mind. His writing made me hyperaware of the importance of cultural contextualization in emotion research and although I’ve been vigilant to certain “American” science biases, I found that my revisits--under the scope of his perspective--cast the other research in a vitally new light. I agree with his suggestion for the revision of mainstream psychology and the need to integrate it with cross cultural studies (Matsumoto p.15). I also agree with Matsumoto that a basic emotions theory that transcends culture is a good working theory even if it’s not completely articulated (yet). There are only so many hormones, based on only so many amino acids, encoded by only so many DNA bases. Certainly, some of these chemicals play a bigger, more primary function than others in the processing and expression of emotion but by like token, they can be mixed in a diversity of chemical cocktails. If an emotion is recognized and expressed across a spectrum of radically different “sociopsychological constructs,” then the likelihood of its universality seems reliably validated (Matsumoto, p.2). The on-going question, as we have repeatedly discussed in class, is if these basic emotions exist, what are they? Matsumoto is convinced by Ekman’s super “six”—anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise, and adds his own “contempt.” He believes these are universal in a cross-culturally acceptable way and re-emphasizes that if we don’t accommodate for a cultural context in our search for them, we may wrongly asses their globalization.

Still, scientists do not always recognize their own bias. In the “Sex Differences…” article, Wager, et al. do not bother to contextualize the sociopsychological constructs influencing the research. Who are the subjects? What kind of culture do they live in? Are they Americans? French? Sudanese? Gay? They briefly touch on the possibility that discrepancies in their findings might suggest “regulation of expression” based on “self-presentation biases” and “beliefs about emotions, including cultural stereotypes” but they continue to generalize using the terms “men” and “women” as if all men and women are alike (and perhaps all men and all women are alike in some ways, but without context, how can we be sure the research is not universalizing the responses of particular men and particular women?) Would their findings be different if they studied men and women from a more matriarchal society or from more diverse sexual orientations? What images are they using to arouse emotion? Did they research whether or not these images were cross-culturally emotionally arousing?


The “Amae” article is far more contextualized. I really enjoyed the idea that “emotions named by a language may act as magnets for emotional experience (Niiya and Ellsworth, p. 293).” It suggests that the larger our emotional vocabulary, the more expansive our palette of “feeling.” As I read it, I was reminded of Barrett’s metaphor of the color wheel to describe basic emotions and the idea that more complex emotions are derivative of these basic tones. In the following days, I found myself referencing Amae in my own relationship anecdotes when other feelings felt less specific. It’s like learning the word for “violet” after previously trying to describe the color as either red or blue or a combination of the two. The feeling/color takes on its own significance and becomes more easily seen, utilized, communicated and in the end, felt. According to Matsumoto’s research, we can not only learn to “see” new feelings, but we can be taught not to see them, as in the case of the Asians rating facial posers as having less intense emotions than Caucasions out of “politeness or ignorance” (Matsumoto, p. 7).

I was struck but the fact that Amae was hard to categorize as an emotion because it did not have a corresponding facial expression or particular physiology (Niiya et al. p.280). Have scientists researched the physiology of Amae? And is facial expression the only behavior that can qualify an emotion? The writers also stated Amae would be “oversimplified” if deemed an emotion because it is relational and involves beliefs, etc. (Niiya et al. p. 281). I wonder what Matsumoto would think of this.

The “First Language” excerpt seems in alignment with Matsumoto’s approach. It is abundantly contextualized while aware of its cultural limitations--such as the idea that Turks might be more reactionary to violent words than Americans who are more removed from war (Harris, et al. p. 269). The use of SCR helps curb the biases of expression regulation, a problem in the research on sex differences, and the historical biases of linguistics have been re-examined and eliminated (Harris, et al. p. 273). It was interesting that childhood reprimands scored the highest on emotional reactivity supporting the theory that in childhood, we are building the emotional systems that dictate our emotional sensitivity as adults (Harris, et al. p. 262). I don’t know much about the child development side of this but perhaps someone in class can shed more light on the relationship between the emotional receptiveness of childhood and the development of adult preference and personality. Even if a second language can be more emotional given the emotional context of learning it, perhaps the wiring for emotional sensitivity, in general, takes place at a much earlier age.