Tuesday, April 8, 2008
Sort of answer to my own questions
I looked back at chapt 8 of Ledoux and he does talk about repressed memories and the hippocampus. He mentions that the memory loss could be due to damage to the hippocampus because of the stress, which we discussed in class. But what about dissociative behavior or denial?Is what we term "consciousness" that subjective? One who dissociates from an experience or denies what we would call conscious facts-how can we explain this biologically.
Frances Clayton
I too have lots of questions about repression! It does not seem so shocking that some memory can be buried way down below and emerge later on, but it is shocking when it comes to the kind of traumatic situations some people repress. Defense mechanisms are a powerful thing. (This is all assuming that you are not one of the decenters of belief in repressed memories.) It seems to me clear (and I think it is stated in this weeks readings althought I can’t put my finger on it) that Freudian unconscious is different from the unconscious we speak of here, yet there must be some simple overlap. Is it – oversimplified – that things in Freudian unconscious are less capable of being retrieved whereas unconscious in the readings for this week means two different things: first, it is talking about the state of alertness and secondly that they are not presently in working memory but that does not mean that they are buried in the Freudian sense?
I also understand that behavior can be caused by those things that a person is not conscious of (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, 165). Not only can the things we are not conscious of result in behaviors and “feelings”, we can also attribute feelings to what is currently in consciousness even when it is not the correct root of the feeling. This leaves lots and lots up in the air! Can we ever really know what is causing our feelings?
Another topic that came up a good bit for me is the awareness of or sense of self. I am not sure I totally understand what is meant by a sense of self. The Tsuchiya article cleared it up for a moment, saying that it was not a concept of ones own body but had more to do with awareness of that one is perceiving through ones own eye’s for example. However it then goes on to say to talk about the psychological idea of core self and how it is the basis for the autobiographical self and a sense of continuity. What does this say about people who deal with sensory integration issues? In regards to emotion is it that they loose a sense of self in sensory overload (for example) that they loose a sense of the continutity of emotional self as well?
In this same sense, we saw some brain images of a woman with dissociative identity disorder in one of my classes today. The brain scans were actually different for the different personalities. Is this to say that the same biological person, because they have different autobiographical selves, they also have differing emotional selves?
I found the Emotion and Consciousness article very straight forward in defining the different parts of emotion and consciousness.
I will also have to say that the Southern use of the word “state” ran through my head throughout these readings: “She was really in a state.” “Now don’t get yourself in a state.” ☺
I too have lots of questions about repression! It does not seem so shocking that some memory can be buried way down below and emerge later on, but it is shocking when it comes to the kind of traumatic situations some people repress. Defense mechanisms are a powerful thing. (This is all assuming that you are not one of the decenters of belief in repressed memories.) It seems to me clear (and I think it is stated in this weeks readings althought I can’t put my finger on it) that Freudian unconscious is different from the unconscious we speak of here, yet there must be some simple overlap. Is it – oversimplified – that things in Freudian unconscious are less capable of being retrieved whereas unconscious in the readings for this week means two different things: first, it is talking about the state of alertness and secondly that they are not presently in working memory but that does not mean that they are buried in the Freudian sense?
I also understand that behavior can be caused by those things that a person is not conscious of (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, 165). Not only can the things we are not conscious of result in behaviors and “feelings”, we can also attribute feelings to what is currently in consciousness even when it is not the correct root of the feeling. This leaves lots and lots up in the air! Can we ever really know what is causing our feelings?
Another topic that came up a good bit for me is the awareness of or sense of self. I am not sure I totally understand what is meant by a sense of self. The Tsuchiya article cleared it up for a moment, saying that it was not a concept of ones own body but had more to do with awareness of that one is perceiving through ones own eye’s for example. However it then goes on to say to talk about the psychological idea of core self and how it is the basis for the autobiographical self and a sense of continuity. What does this say about people who deal with sensory integration issues? In regards to emotion is it that they loose a sense of self in sensory overload (for example) that they loose a sense of the continutity of emotional self as well?
In this same sense, we saw some brain images of a woman with dissociative identity disorder in one of my classes today. The brain scans were actually different for the different personalities. Is this to say that the same biological person, because they have different autobiographical selves, they also have differing emotional selves?
I found the Emotion and Consciousness article very straight forward in defining the different parts of emotion and consciousness.
I will also have to say that the Southern use of the word “state” ran through my head throughout these readings: “She was really in a state.” “Now don’t get yourself in a state.” ☺
Repression/Consciousness
Suzanne Ardanowski
Feeling Brain
4-8-08
So now I feel like I need things redefined. Is consciousness just working memory? I guess you could define it this way, but what about things I may not be thinking about, but I can retrieve from long or short term memory-we only call them conscious when they enter working memory? We were reading about repressed traumatic memory in Jan’s pathology class and I was wondering how these memories can be “blocked” from a scientific perspective. I feel that when science talks about “unconscious” we are not talking about the Freudian/psychoanalytic unconscious per se. The article “Emotions and Consciousness” states, “..stimuli can, under certain experience, fail to lead to conscious experience, even though they can trigger emotional responses…..but can there be a failure to experience the emotional responses themselves? (Later)…Can emotion states that are not experienced at all still motivate behavior?” These questions in the framework of trauma, especially childhood trauma, are important. Trauma can influence behavior, even if not consciously, and even if emotional responses were not experienced. I can see how LeDoux’s fear response, the blinding studies, and the subliminal studies are unconscious processes that may or may not become conscious, but what about conscious turned unconscious? Are the same systems, pathways, brain regions involved? How do our defenses turn conscious into unconscious? What about dissociation, and as I mentioned, repression? How does this happen? Do they become blocked from working memory? Ochner and Gross added the term “mood” to the mix of our terminology. I thought it was interesting that they defined emotions as distinct from moods because emotions have “identifiable objects or triggers.” More food for thought.
Sunday, April 6, 2008
4/6/08
Mikal Shapiro
According to Ochsner and Gross, one of the ways researchers have investigated emotion control is through “behavior regulation,” such as the restriction of physical expression; a method that ultimately excites SNS activity, hinders memory and, in the end, doesn’t really change how happy or crappy one feels (p. 243). This makes sense given our LeDoux readings: If emotions are, in large part, interoceptive, suppression of expression may only mask external systems without addressing the internal ones. Because this masking further activates the nervous systems, behavior regulation may cause more aggravation in the long run and may even promote dysfunctional personality traits such as passive-aggressiveness (I haven’t researched this. It’s just my own folk theory based on personal bad experience). Research also validates that feelings can occur even if the ability to express them behaviorally is limited by lesions, locked-in syndrome, paralysis, etc. (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, p. 163).
Cognitive models suggest more beneficial emotion regulation through “attentional control” and “cognitive change.” By reconditioning the subjects’ expectations of natural and conditioned pain stimuli, research shows the mind can more globally control emotion states than a body-mind-emotion approach. This mind-over-matter method stems from a conscious “reappraisal” of negative memories--the ability to redefine how we feel about provocative personal experience. Through a cognitive approach, we can “neutralize” bad memories without eradicating them: In a sense, forgive them but not forget them (Oschner and Gross, pp. 243-245).
I believe this kind of hindsight is an extremely important intellectual function. It offers us keener options with future decision-making by giving us vital information about the formation and also the internal negotiation of negative experiences. Research shows emotion affects our decisions (Dolan, p. 1194). More emotional-processing options means better decision making and more conscious creation of our lives. We could learn to harness our emotional flow. I’d like to think LeDoux is right when he concludes, “wouldn’t it be wonderful if we did understand where our emotions were taking us from moment to moment, day to day, and year to year, and why?” (p. 303). I’d like to know. Wouldn’t you? Or do you think life would lose some of its remarkable mystery if we understood our emotional ticks? Would the choice of whether or not to relinquish ourselves to the push-pull of moods create a flat line of emotional experience or would the choice result in, as LeDoux writes, “a more harmonious integration of reason and passion.” I don’t know but harmony sounds good. I’ll vote for that.
Although we don’t need to be conscious of our emotions to experience them, the fact that we can be is made possible through the overlapping of emotion and consciousness-generating brain systems (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, p. 160). Though this “clarity” is not very conducive to quick-and-dirty survival conditions (LeDoux), it is necessary for long-term planning. LeDoux writes about the growing reciprocity of amygdala-cortex connections in higher primates and I ponder (with a nod to Tsuchiya and Adolphs’ recommendation for the collaboration of “neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers” [my italics] p. 158) whether the scientific investigation of emotions could strengthen the amygdala-cortex reciprocity by helping us become more aware of our interoceptive natures. Are we planning our own emotional evolution?
Mikal Shapiro
According to Ochsner and Gross, one of the ways researchers have investigated emotion control is through “behavior regulation,” such as the restriction of physical expression; a method that ultimately excites SNS activity, hinders memory and, in the end, doesn’t really change how happy or crappy one feels (p. 243). This makes sense given our LeDoux readings: If emotions are, in large part, interoceptive, suppression of expression may only mask external systems without addressing the internal ones. Because this masking further activates the nervous systems, behavior regulation may cause more aggravation in the long run and may even promote dysfunctional personality traits such as passive-aggressiveness (I haven’t researched this. It’s just my own folk theory based on personal bad experience). Research also validates that feelings can occur even if the ability to express them behaviorally is limited by lesions, locked-in syndrome, paralysis, etc. (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, p. 163).
Cognitive models suggest more beneficial emotion regulation through “attentional control” and “cognitive change.” By reconditioning the subjects’ expectations of natural and conditioned pain stimuli, research shows the mind can more globally control emotion states than a body-mind-emotion approach. This mind-over-matter method stems from a conscious “reappraisal” of negative memories--the ability to redefine how we feel about provocative personal experience. Through a cognitive approach, we can “neutralize” bad memories without eradicating them: In a sense, forgive them but not forget them (Oschner and Gross, pp. 243-245).
I believe this kind of hindsight is an extremely important intellectual function. It offers us keener options with future decision-making by giving us vital information about the formation and also the internal negotiation of negative experiences. Research shows emotion affects our decisions (Dolan, p. 1194). More emotional-processing options means better decision making and more conscious creation of our lives. We could learn to harness our emotional flow. I’d like to think LeDoux is right when he concludes, “wouldn’t it be wonderful if we did understand where our emotions were taking us from moment to moment, day to day, and year to year, and why?” (p. 303). I’d like to know. Wouldn’t you? Or do you think life would lose some of its remarkable mystery if we understood our emotional ticks? Would the choice of whether or not to relinquish ourselves to the push-pull of moods create a flat line of emotional experience or would the choice result in, as LeDoux writes, “a more harmonious integration of reason and passion.” I don’t know but harmony sounds good. I’ll vote for that.
Although we don’t need to be conscious of our emotions to experience them, the fact that we can be is made possible through the overlapping of emotion and consciousness-generating brain systems (Tsuchiya and Adolphs, p. 160). Though this “clarity” is not very conducive to quick-and-dirty survival conditions (LeDoux), it is necessary for long-term planning. LeDoux writes about the growing reciprocity of amygdala-cortex connections in higher primates and I ponder (with a nod to Tsuchiya and Adolphs’ recommendation for the collaboration of “neuroscientists, psychologists and philosophers” [my italics] p. 158) whether the scientific investigation of emotions could strengthen the amygdala-cortex reciprocity by helping us become more aware of our interoceptive natures. Are we planning our own emotional evolution?
The Godly Amygdala
[Isn’t it amazing, now to read about the brain and have a visual image of what it is we are talking about?!]
We have arrived at our concluding chapter of Le Doux and much was learned until this point and much is still open to discussion. I wonder if we will ever know for certain and how helpful it may be in our advancement and aid us at selfcontrol?
Le Doux has now turned our attention to the feeling of the emotion, and by doing so has come a full circle from where he began. He is zooming in on the picture of emotions with feelings in the foreground. He emphasizes with his ‘simple idea’ that we need to understand conscious experiences in order to grasp what and where subjective emotions arise, and vice versa. I think this is crucial in understanding the theory he builds upon this base, in which working memory becomes more than just a short momentary memory system, but rather is a storage system and an active processing mechanism necessary in conscious thought. Stephan Kosslyn adds: ‘also the interplay between information that is stored temporarily and a larger body of stored knowledge’ is part of the ways in which the working memory intertwines information, like a puzzle maker. Is this not one of the most fundamental points of being a conscious human being; having the ability to place immediate received information into the idea of what the world should be or is like? Take the idea of the snake, if we have fear because we know by some previous knowledge that this animal might harm us we will be frightened at its sight. But what when the snake is just a log and we are convinced it is a snake, is our fear response not as valid or real to the feeler same as if the stimulus would be a real snake? What is it that makes our emotional body correspond with reality, and where does our mind play tricks on our emotional body?
Another interesting point is the idea that different buffers (=potential inputs in working memory) which are combined with long term memory, seem to me to be the reasoning to why people react and differ emotionally in the same experience. It is akin to the idea that two people can walk down the same road and ‘pick up’ completely different reflections. This, in the emotional world, would be due to the fact that the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulated are both part of the frontal lobe attention network: ‘a cognitive system involved in selective attention, mental resource allocation, decision making, and voluntary movement control.’ The connection between the outside input world and the interior emotional processing amygdala, is what enables us to be conscious of an experienced event; as I understand it, the mental self needs to be a conscious agent of the event for the emotion to affect us feelingly. Can an unconscious emotion occur? Or do we need consciousness to have an emotional experience as we have named the process of feeling? What about animals such as fish, can they have emotions that they are not conscious of, or are they aware of the feeling but it cannot be compared to an experience as such?
The idea that some part of consciousness remains inaccessible to us is overwhelmingly complex. If some of the subsymbolic processing remains unintelligible to us as the conscious agents, it must be concluded that there probably is no possibility of full awareness and this is our curse and our blessing. It is what most perplexes and frustrates us in trying to understand the phenomena of our mind, but it also would be very exasperating if every time we wanted to take a step, we would be aware of the dialogue between the muscles and brain. Hence my title, it seems like the amygdala’s activation and projection is what makes it possible for the forebrain to react to arousal. And as said the prolonged arousal is an indicator to emotional stimuli and has probably to do with the involvement of the amygdala. What I wonder is what agent if not our conscious decides upon a ‘meaningful’ stimuli, and when arousal must or mustn’t occur? By Le Doux’s theory the body is the ‘feedback’ to the amygdala and not the other way around as has also been argued. The body responds by visceral and behavioral expression giving feedback to the brain as emotional agent. However let’s remember, Le Doux is ‘placing his bets’ in favor of the bodies feeling in reacting to emotions. Much more will need to be solved in the future and I think evolutions will decide when best to let us in on its grand plan.
We have arrived at our concluding chapter of Le Doux and much was learned until this point and much is still open to discussion. I wonder if we will ever know for certain and how helpful it may be in our advancement and aid us at selfcontrol?
Le Doux has now turned our attention to the feeling of the emotion, and by doing so has come a full circle from where he began. He is zooming in on the picture of emotions with feelings in the foreground. He emphasizes with his ‘simple idea’ that we need to understand conscious experiences in order to grasp what and where subjective emotions arise, and vice versa. I think this is crucial in understanding the theory he builds upon this base, in which working memory becomes more than just a short momentary memory system, but rather is a storage system and an active processing mechanism necessary in conscious thought. Stephan Kosslyn adds: ‘also the interplay between information that is stored temporarily and a larger body of stored knowledge’ is part of the ways in which the working memory intertwines information, like a puzzle maker. Is this not one of the most fundamental points of being a conscious human being; having the ability to place immediate received information into the idea of what the world should be or is like? Take the idea of the snake, if we have fear because we know by some previous knowledge that this animal might harm us we will be frightened at its sight. But what when the snake is just a log and we are convinced it is a snake, is our fear response not as valid or real to the feeler same as if the stimulus would be a real snake? What is it that makes our emotional body correspond with reality, and where does our mind play tricks on our emotional body?
Another interesting point is the idea that different buffers (=potential inputs in working memory) which are combined with long term memory, seem to me to be the reasoning to why people react and differ emotionally in the same experience. It is akin to the idea that two people can walk down the same road and ‘pick up’ completely different reflections. This, in the emotional world, would be due to the fact that the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulated are both part of the frontal lobe attention network: ‘a cognitive system involved in selective attention, mental resource allocation, decision making, and voluntary movement control.’ The connection between the outside input world and the interior emotional processing amygdala, is what enables us to be conscious of an experienced event; as I understand it, the mental self needs to be a conscious agent of the event for the emotion to affect us feelingly. Can an unconscious emotion occur? Or do we need consciousness to have an emotional experience as we have named the process of feeling? What about animals such as fish, can they have emotions that they are not conscious of, or are they aware of the feeling but it cannot be compared to an experience as such?
The idea that some part of consciousness remains inaccessible to us is overwhelmingly complex. If some of the subsymbolic processing remains unintelligible to us as the conscious agents, it must be concluded that there probably is no possibility of full awareness and this is our curse and our blessing. It is what most perplexes and frustrates us in trying to understand the phenomena of our mind, but it also would be very exasperating if every time we wanted to take a step, we would be aware of the dialogue between the muscles and brain. Hence my title, it seems like the amygdala’s activation and projection is what makes it possible for the forebrain to react to arousal. And as said the prolonged arousal is an indicator to emotional stimuli and has probably to do with the involvement of the amygdala. What I wonder is what agent if not our conscious decides upon a ‘meaningful’ stimuli, and when arousal must or mustn’t occur? By Le Doux’s theory the body is the ‘feedback’ to the amygdala and not the other way around as has also been argued. The body responds by visceral and behavioral expression giving feedback to the brain as emotional agent. However let’s remember, Le Doux is ‘placing his bets’ in favor of the bodies feeling in reacting to emotions. Much more will need to be solved in the future and I think evolutions will decide when best to let us in on its grand plan.
Amina Sariahmed 4-9-08
In the chapter entitled "Once more, with feelings" Ledoux wraps up his arguments and leaves us with some interesting food for thought.
When he discusses amygdala triggered arousal he brings up dream sleep. He notes that "during sleep the cortex is in the unaroused state"(1996, 285). This makes seems rather intuitive but perhaps this is because "the brain does it so effortlessly" (1996, 284). But this also seems apparent if we consider the experiences of having very frightening nightmares or very pleasant dreams. In each case the arousal causes our body to react to these emotions we face during dream sleep. I wonder if it is the intensity of the emotional content of a dream or a nightmare that can sometimes wake us out of deep sleep and feel quite unsettled, whether that be a pleasurable or distressing kind of arousal.
Another interesting assertion Ledoux makes is that "Arousal helps lock you into the emotional state you are in" (1996, 289). He explains that "this can be very useful (you don't want to get distracted when you are in danger) but can also be an annoyance (once the fear system is turned on, it's hard to turn it off-- this is the nature of anxiety" (1996, 289) This is another point that might seem obvious but I wonder if this state is something that causes us to procrastinate and allows us to continue to do so. I suppose I can only speak of my own conscious experiences and perhaps some of you can relate, but really I could just be imagining it all as a result of "the problem of other minds" (1996, 300). I'm glad Ledoux brings this up because it's another great point to ponder.
We can also talk about Ledoux's exploration of the question regarding animal consciousness. (1996, 300). This is a very important issue in relation to experimentation on animal subjects and whether or not they 'suffer' as a result of some kinds of experimentation.
The last thing I would like to discuss is the following statement Ledoux makes: "...feelings will be different in a brain that can classify the world linguistically and categorize experiences in words than in a brain than cannot" (1996, 302). I'm not sure I agree with this statement;will fear in a chimp be different than fear in a human just because I can say "I'm scared" but the chimp can't? What do you guys think?
When he discusses amygdala triggered arousal he brings up dream sleep. He notes that "during sleep the cortex is in the unaroused state"(1996, 285). This makes seems rather intuitive but perhaps this is because "the brain does it so effortlessly" (1996, 284). But this also seems apparent if we consider the experiences of having very frightening nightmares or very pleasant dreams. In each case the arousal causes our body to react to these emotions we face during dream sleep. I wonder if it is the intensity of the emotional content of a dream or a nightmare that can sometimes wake us out of deep sleep and feel quite unsettled, whether that be a pleasurable or distressing kind of arousal.
Another interesting assertion Ledoux makes is that "Arousal helps lock you into the emotional state you are in" (1996, 289). He explains that "this can be very useful (you don't want to get distracted when you are in danger) but can also be an annoyance (once the fear system is turned on, it's hard to turn it off-- this is the nature of anxiety" (1996, 289) This is another point that might seem obvious but I wonder if this state is something that causes us to procrastinate and allows us to continue to do so. I suppose I can only speak of my own conscious experiences and perhaps some of you can relate, but really I could just be imagining it all as a result of "the problem of other minds" (1996, 300). I'm glad Ledoux brings this up because it's another great point to ponder.
We can also talk about Ledoux's exploration of the question regarding animal consciousness. (1996, 300). This is a very important issue in relation to experimentation on animal subjects and whether or not they 'suffer' as a result of some kinds of experimentation.
The last thing I would like to discuss is the following statement Ledoux makes: "...feelings will be different in a brain that can classify the world linguistically and categorize experiences in words than in a brain than cannot" (1996, 302). I'm not sure I agree with this statement;will fear in a chimp be different than fear in a human just because I can say "I'm scared" but the chimp can't? What do you guys think?
"Harmonious Integration of Reason and Passion"
This week we read LeDoux’s final thoughts about the role of consciousness in emotion and emotional regulation. LeDoux examines the possibility that as we evolve cortical structures will continue to have greater control over the amygdala or the “low road” processes. However, LeDoux expects it is more probable that we will develop a “more harmonious integration of reason and passion.” This leads into the three other readings which examine ideas about cognitive-emotional connectivity and the role of consciousness.
I thought that Dolan’s work really continued with LeDoux’s train of thought. Both Dolan and LeDoux emphasize how emotion is unique as a feeling that can take control over the other systems and influence cognition, perception, memory, etc. Dolan describes emotion as “less encapsulated than other psychological states.” Yet rather than “encapsulate” emotions through more cortical control it might make more sense to just have improved communications between the cortex and the emotional processes.
I was really interested in the study that showed a correlation between index of visceral awareness and “better predictive judgments” in shock trials. We know that predictability is one way to prevent stress. In contrast, disorganization or unpredictability can cause the stress system to go into high alert. Thus it makes sense that from bodily awareness and predictive judgment one might experience less stress from arousal. This is a great example of how a more successful emotional system is not constituted of merely more cortical control, but more fluid interaction between consciousness and the body. Dolan also examines how damage to the PFC leads to personally disadvantageous choices. This also indicates how integration between cognitive and emotional processes is important.
In ch. 8 LeDoux described how it is possible that psychoanalytic therapy works through emphasis of cortical control over the amygdala. After reading ch. 9 I see why LeDoux seemed a bit wary of this process. I remember early on LeDoux cited MacLean’s idea that psychotherapy should begin with the therapist relating the patient’s visceral brain (p. 97). I think this makes a very powerful case for Dance Movement and Arts therapies. Rather than privilege language or cortical dominance, these therapies focus on visceral and bodily awareness as a means to address the connection between emotion and consciousness.
LeDoux addresses the PFC as newer, recently evolved structure. This look at the evolution of the brain made me think of Bruce Perry’s lecture last week and where we are headed as a society. Perry discussed the transformation of our modern society into a less relational and interactive world where emotional development is neglected and not highly valued. Perry views emotional development as the foundation for cognitive or abstract thinking. Without that foundation we cannot really develop higher cortical functions, not to mention a more evolved interaction between cortex and emotion. In addition, early emotional trauma predicts comorbidities. How does this shift away from the natural world shape the development of the brain, making us unhealthy and unable to respond to stress and trauma? Are we moving in the direction LeDoux predicted?
I thought that Dolan’s work really continued with LeDoux’s train of thought. Both Dolan and LeDoux emphasize how emotion is unique as a feeling that can take control over the other systems and influence cognition, perception, memory, etc. Dolan describes emotion as “less encapsulated than other psychological states.” Yet rather than “encapsulate” emotions through more cortical control it might make more sense to just have improved communications between the cortex and the emotional processes.
I was really interested in the study that showed a correlation between index of visceral awareness and “better predictive judgments” in shock trials. We know that predictability is one way to prevent stress. In contrast, disorganization or unpredictability can cause the stress system to go into high alert. Thus it makes sense that from bodily awareness and predictive judgment one might experience less stress from arousal. This is a great example of how a more successful emotional system is not constituted of merely more cortical control, but more fluid interaction between consciousness and the body. Dolan also examines how damage to the PFC leads to personally disadvantageous choices. This also indicates how integration between cognitive and emotional processes is important.
In ch. 8 LeDoux described how it is possible that psychoanalytic therapy works through emphasis of cortical control over the amygdala. After reading ch. 9 I see why LeDoux seemed a bit wary of this process. I remember early on LeDoux cited MacLean’s idea that psychotherapy should begin with the therapist relating the patient’s visceral brain (p. 97). I think this makes a very powerful case for Dance Movement and Arts therapies. Rather than privilege language or cortical dominance, these therapies focus on visceral and bodily awareness as a means to address the connection between emotion and consciousness.
LeDoux addresses the PFC as newer, recently evolved structure. This look at the evolution of the brain made me think of Bruce Perry’s lecture last week and where we are headed as a society. Perry discussed the transformation of our modern society into a less relational and interactive world where emotional development is neglected and not highly valued. Perry views emotional development as the foundation for cognitive or abstract thinking. Without that foundation we cannot really develop higher cortical functions, not to mention a more evolved interaction between cortex and emotion. In addition, early emotional trauma predicts comorbidities. How does this shift away from the natural world shape the development of the brain, making us unhealthy and unable to respond to stress and trauma? Are we moving in the direction LeDoux predicted?
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