Tuesday, January 29, 2008

Emotional Underpinnings (Week 2)

Tessa Noonan-Jan. 29, 2008

Perhaps the most fascinating component of this week's reading (a difficult task to be sure) was in LeDoux's review of Nisbett & Wilson's work, and his subsequent work with Michael Gazzaniga. These experiments examined the deep emotional content that is experienced and then labeled and qualified. However, such research began to evidence that much of this labeling was often wrong, a type of guess at explaining the stimuli and the response. This was particularly evident in patients with split brains, who had no ability to communicate right brain function, but could somehow still experience the emotional content of their experiences (an amazing phenomenon in itself). After providing the right side with a stimulus, LeDoux states that "time after time, the left hemisphere made up explanations as if it knew why the response was performed" (p. 32). The almost subliminal quality of these pervasive emotions, as well as the left brains reaction to justify such an action go far to interpret the brain's emotional content. 

Along these lines, I found the biological connects that Darwin asserted and Ekman, Sorenson, and Freisen supported to be very interesting. The fact that there are ways in which the entire human species experiences and interprets emotion similarly is quite amazing. However, I think that some of this research, particularly the article on cultural displays of emotion, minimizes the extent to which the interpretation of emotional forces plays a part in the experience and conceptions of emotions as a whole. 

Appraisal and Intuition, Classification of States of Mind

According to Ledoux as demonstrated by Zajonc's studies , it is "possible for the brain to know that something is good or bad before it knows exactly what it is" (69) I wonder if this initial appraisal is the basis of intuition.

I find Ledoux's classification of motivation and personality as "other mental processes" (68) as opposed to emotion somewhat problematic because aren't mental states of mind such as these based on and created from emotional experiences?

Sunday, January 27, 2008

Darwin's Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals

Aiden Bussey

I found Darwin's Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals to be both interesting and somewhat complicated. I found myself wishing that I had time to read all the chapters rather than just the beginning and end; Darwin seemed to be aware of many of the points I felt were problematic. One of these is the way in which Darwin attempts to generalize the physical effects of emotions. For instance, Darwin says that fear causes paralysis and inaction, which it sometimes does. But fear can also be a tremendous motivating factor. Similarly, he says that fear robs the individual of his or her strength, where people under the influence of fear can be capable of extreme, sometimes superhuman, feats of strength. Darwin is certainly aware of this discrepancy and bothered by it -- he is sure, for instance, to qualify his statements about exciting or depressive emotions saying that all of the depressive emotions are capable of causing either short-term excitement or excitement when experienced in the extreme. It seems that one question these discrepancies raises for me is whether the terms being used are really appropriate. The fault may lie either in the classification of emotion -- grouping two separate emotions as "fear" -- or in the categories the emotions are being put into -- exciting versus depressive. Because Darwin considers excitement to be a central quality of the emotions in determining the form of the expression (exciting emotions leading to an overflow of nerve force and the activation of involuntary and habitual gestures) this issue needs some sort of resolution.

One thing I found very interesting about Darwin was his use of literature. In just the section that we read, Shakespeare appears at least twice. Importantly, the Shakespeare quotations are not merely decorative -- they do not merely adorn the beginning of a chapter and set the mood or provide a sort of accessible front to the public. Instead, the Shakespeare quotations are regarded as having something centrally important and scientifically valid to say about the human experience of emotion. Darwin uses Shakespeare as an appeal to the audience: we know this is so; look what Shakespeare said.

I was a little hesitant to accept Darwin's proposed evolutionary path describing the acquisition of emotional expression in social animals and found it to be very similar to Lamarkism's inheritance of acquired characteristics. Much of Darwin's argument hinges on the idea that voluntary actions precede habitual actions, which precede inherited or instinctual actions. Darwin to not take the reverse route very seriously at all -- he does not expend very much time or space in dismissing the idea that emotional expression may progress from reflex toward voluntary actions, though perhaps I misunderstood his argument. To me, it makes more sense that emotional expression and emotional experience would grow out of a reflexive actions in part because this is the progression that seems to occur in individual animals (human or non-human) -- Darwin talks at length about infants' more extreme and instinctive screaming in discomfort as being the source of frowning in both anger and sorrow -- and reflexive actions are present in much simpler organisms than consciousness or willpower. Reflexes are simpler than conscious or voluntary actions. While Darwin's argument does make some sense from where he starts -- "lower" mammals -- when one considers the entire advancement of evolution and the wider range of behaviors that must be accounted for, it is hard to accept voluntary or consciously chosen actions as a source. I do not disagree with Darwin's argument that emotional expression may be physically or instinctively based and inherited from parent to offspring, and I also do not disagree that an understanding of emotional expression may be similarly inherited, but I do consider the arguments he uses to explain the evolutionary development of emotional expression in need of expansion and especially to more fully and thoroughly refute alternate paths of development.

Week 2 Post--Sylviane

Sylviane Boddy


I found one of the most compelling aspects of this week’s readings on the evolution of emotions to be the concept of the origin of emotions, a topic that is quite controversial. I was intrigued by James’s discussion in What is an Emotion?, in which he sequence of stimuli, body response and emotion. His rather unorthodox hypothesis that was the stimuli causes a body response that causes the emotion, such as you are scared of a bear because you run. This argument, which I feel has at least some merit, stayed in the back of my mind while I did this weeks readings and found that I was able to clarify some of my own feelings towards this standpoint.

The reading that I found most interesting was Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen’s article on autonomic nervous system activity. This paper discussed an experiment in which nervous system activity was recorded as participants relived emotional experience or constructed, muscle by muscle, facial expressions that are prototypes of specific emotions. It determined that not only are there autonomic differences between four negative emotions (disgust, anger, fear, sadness) but also that constructing emotional faces produces autonomic activity. This finding initially seems to support James’s theory that the physical reaction occurs before the emotional one, since creating the physical state of facial muscles can induce bodily responses that constitute emotional responses. However, upon further reading and thought, reveals that although some autonomic activity is generated, it is impossible for individuals to produce the complex patterns of autonomic activity that truly make up and emotional reaction. The minimal reactions that were produced and record in this study, such as heart rate and muscle tension, although usually indicative of some sort of emotion, do not necessarily create an emotion.

This idea was reinforced by the writings of Darwin, in which he detailed the emotional responses of many animals. For example, he describes a hostile dog walking towards a man and how his head is raised, tail erect, and walks stiffly. As I read through Darwin’s accounts of animals’ responses in different emotional states, I realized that many of the physical characteristic of these states overlap amongst emotions, and that it must be more than a combination of traits to cause a true emotion. The same is true of humans; a physical state of shaking and sweating may be found in individuals who are experiencing fear or anxiety. Similarly, activities such as exercising can cause an increased heart rate and sweating but do not result in an emotional response. Further, the physical reactions that occur must themselves start in the brain as well. All of this evidence leads me to think that the sequence of an emotional response must be stimulus to emotion to body response. Perhaps my biological background is creating a bias, but it seems illogical, in light of this weeks readings, to think that mere physical state can cause an emotion. I am curious if there would a way to test this idea, or if it has already been tested. Since physical states, such as muscle tension, would ultimately start in motor control regions of the brain, would it be possible to monitor which neural activity is happening first? Studies similar to the one conducted by Ekman, et al. but using more precise measure of emotional and physical state, such as MRI for example, would, I believe, reveal a great deal.

1/27/08

Frances Clayton

I will use Darwin’s three principles as an outline to discuss three different things that came up for me in this weeks reading. In the first principle I found a strong link between Darwin and LeDoux. As for the second principle, I am not quite sure I grasp all of Darwin’s reasoning and will discuss my major source of questioning. In the third principle, specifically in the discussion of the “power of association” I felt that there were some specific implications for clinical work. (This is certainly not to imply that each of these topics is limited to only one of the principles.)

I. Movements which are serviceable to gratify desire or relieve sensation and are performed often become so habitual that they become innate or inherited and are performed whether servable or not.

LeDoux’s seventh theme of the nature of emotions says “emotions are things that happen to us rather than things we will to occur.” (pg. 19) While he admits that we people do things in an attempt to control their emotions and may succeed in mediating them, he clearly states that emotions are stronger than our will. “While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness.” (pg.19) It is true that, at least in my experience, I have not been able to will emotions away. It is almost as if the more we try to make an emotion disappear the more aware, or conscious, we are of it.
LeDoux does not only make this point, he then attributes it to the stage in the evolutionary process that we currently find ourselves. He says that at this point the brain has much stronger “wiring” from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems than from cognitive to emotional. While LeDoux does not indulge us enough to search for the reasoning to this, I believe it can be found in Darwin’s first principle.
Darwin’s first principle states that actions are at some point conscious and serviceable and then due to repetition become habit and eventually are so habitual that they become innate and inherited from one generation to the next. Why then is the connection stronger from emotional to cognitive than from cognitive to emotional? It seems to me that this is evolutionarily necessary. Is the emotional response not more necessary for survival than the ability to stifle that emotional response?
Darwin uses the term “reflex actions” to refer to an action which excited muscles or glands into action that can take place outside of consciousness. To illustrate reflex actions he uses an experience he had with a puff adder at a zoo. Standing close to the thick glass plate between himself and the snake, he was determined not to “start” back if the snake struck at him. Despite all of his determination, the snake struck and he jumped. “My will and reason were powerless against the imagination of a danger which had never been experienced,” he says.
In looking at this through the evolutionary perspective of Darwin and in regards to his first principle, it could be inferred that a serviceable action (jumping back from a dangerous snake) has over time become innate in humans. If humans are to servive, they must avoid such dangers. While it is necessary for survival that we react emotionally, it is not necessary for survival that we are able to mediate this reaction. Had the snake not been behind glass, and the reaction not been immediate, the result could have been fatal. This is a necessary action. However, there is no real danger to Darwin “starting” when the threat is actually not there. Darwin’s will and reason were powerless against the expression of emotion. There is little control over emotional reactions – regardless of the determination.
LeDoux says that “at this point in our evolutionary history” it is the case that “conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood consciousness.” This phrasing seems to imply that as our evolutionary history continues, this may not be the case. It seems clear to me that in our evolutionary history, humans must first develop the habit of serviceable actions. This is indeed more necessary than the ability to tell when those actions need not be employed.


II. Antithesis – A state of mind leads to serviceable action and the opposite state of mind leads to opposite action though they have no service

While this principle of antithesis seems clear to me, I feel as if I am missing a piece. As I have read it, there seem to be times that it is a chicken or egg argument. His point as I have read it, is that when one state of mind causes a serviceable action, the opposite state of mind causes the opposite reaction though it may be of no service.
One of the examples he uses is the dog approaching another dog or a person in a hostile frame of mind. This dog approaches with a stiff body, staring eyes, hair on end, head raised, ears and tail erect, canine teeth exposed, etc. The antithetical expression, when the dog sees her master, is shown through a flexible body, smooth hair, loosely hanging lips, eyes darting around, ears low, tail wagging, head lowered and crouching.
For this to support Darwin’s second principle we must suppose that he intends the first set of actions, those of the hostile approach, to be serviceable and those actions in approaching the master simply to be the antithesis of the hostile ones. Possibly it is that the raised hair, stiff body, erect ears and tail, etc. make the dog seems larger, stronger and therefore more threatening to the opponent. The exposed canine teeth show the threat of a bite and the growl shows displeasure of some sort. Ok, this all still seems to make sense. That being the serviceable expression, of course the others are the antithesis.
However, how can we tell which ones are serviceable. It seems that the place to start is with the aggressive necessary actions of protection. Why? Could it not as easily be said that the crouching, lowered ears, wagging tail, hair down, and flexible body make it clear that the dog appear smaller and therefore less threatening? Could the serviceable actions not as easily be in the dogs approach to the master? Could it be said that it is serviceable for the dog to appear submissive as to protect itself from attack?
My initial thought was that the expression in the approach to the master was a form of communication in opposition to the serviceable actions of the hostile approach. But then I realized it could as easily be argued that the hostile approach is simply a means of communication showing opposition to the friendly approach. While I am not sure I totally disagree with the second principle, it seems impossible to me to prove that one is more serviceable than the other.
Darwin seems to address this when he says that “it is incredible to think that they (dogs) could ever have deliberately thought of drawing back and depressing their ears,…because they knew that these movements stood in direct opposition to those assumed under an opposite and savage frame of mind.” How is it so unlikely that they “think” of this more so than it is likely that they “think” that holding tail erect and stiffening the body show hostility?

III. Direct action of an excited nervous system on the body independent of the will and partially independent, although influenced by habit.

This third principle, especially the discussion of the power of association (also mentioned in discussion of the first principle), made me think of a specific case of Freud’s. The case dealt with a woman who could not drink water and was therefore physically suffering. During treatment, it was discovered that she had seen a cat drink out of her water glass. This was so incredibly repulsive to her that from that moment on, she was incapable of consuming water. This memory had been suppressed but once it was brought to light and dealt with, the woman was again able to drink water.
Darwin talks about how the power of association can be one reason for the involuntary actions resulting from an excited nervous system. He says that a “moderate amount of exertion will tend to act on the heart; an on the principle of association…we may feel nearly sure that any sensation or emotion, as great pain or rage, which has habitually led too much muscular action” will also act on the heart.
It seems to me that when you combine Darwin’s third principle with his earlier discussion of the power of association, there is an explanation for psychosomatic symptoms. In the above example, the association between the experience and water caused an emotional response even though the experience was not in consciousness. Independent of the will, but through association, the body responded.

Week 2 Post

Sara Dholakia

I thoroughly enjoyed the chapters we read out of Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals for many reasons; Darwin presents many of the ideas I had been pondering in regards to facial expression in an eloquent and articulate way, and to prove his point, uses everyday examples that anyone can relate to, whether they be a part of the lay public or of the scientific community.

Regarding the first principle Darwin expounds is “The Principle of Serviceable Associated Habits” (29), and this essentially asserts that complex actions directly or indirectly serve certain states of mind to relieve or gratify sensations, and whenever that state of mind is aroused, through sheer force of habit, those complex actions are launched. This principle implicitly addresses the presence and force of the unconscious, which LeDoux discusses. This is of course not the unconscious of Freud, but the cognitive unconscious. Darwin permits that some of the aforementioned actions may be suppressed through an exercise of will, but one would necessarily have to be aware of the action taking place.

The second principle Darwin puts forth is “The Principle of Antithesis” (29), which takes into account the first principle then claims that when states of mind opposite from the ones causing the actions mentioned in the first principle are aroused, there is a “strong, involuntary tendency” to perform actions that are of an opposite nature. Upon first reading this, I was not sure if I agreed with this theory or not, but it must be said that Darwin offers many compelling examples such as that of the cat and dog. The cat, both domestic and wild, when ready to pounce, crouches down, bristling somewhat, etc; this reaction is clearly an evolutionary adaptation, allowing the cat to spring into action from its crouching position upon seeing its target. The opposite reaction, seen in domesticated cats, is that of affection towards its caretaker. In this situation, the cat perks up its ears and tail and perhaps rubs itself on the caretaker. In the wild, I can see no need for any such action, and so it follows that it is indeed very possible that this reaction is merely the opposite of the attack position.

The third and last principle that Darwin offers isThe Principle of Actions Due to the Constitution of the Nervous System, Independently from the First of the Will, and Independently of a Certain Extent of Habit” (29). For this one, I had to check dictionary.com for the definition of “sensorium,” which means the seat of sensation in the brain. We now know that there is not just one area designated as the “seat of sensation,” and that different parts of the brain are employed for different types of sensation. Given this, on a technical level, Darwin’s theory is false, and as such, requires no discussion.

To conclude, this reading certainly gave me a lot to think about, and I am incredibly interested to know what everyone else thought about this, and if I was the only one persuaded by Darwin.

Reflections cognition & the unconscious

Suzanne Ardanowski

Feeling Brain

Response to week 2 Jan 30, 2008

 

 

            I now know what Elizabeth meant when she said that LeDoux makes his opinion clear in his writing.  Fortunately for me it is an opinion I happen to agree with!  Being a psychology student has inevitably brought me to the concepts of conscious and unconscious aspects of the human mind.  Yet after reading about emotion, cognition, conscious, unconscious, culture, social race bias, how the human body physically responds to emotion, and how we can manipulate these variables to change behavior, my mind was really overwhelmed and amazed at the same time.

Like LeDoux, I am a believer in the unconscious.  Studying lots of Freud last year contributed to my ever-growing conviction of the power and influence of the unconscious on human thought and behavior.  I had never previously thought of cognition as being unconscious, but it is now obvious how some cognition must be unconscious, such as LeDoux’s example of how we form sentences without consciously thinking about it. However, he differentiates between the cognitive unconscious and the more Freudian dynamic unconscious (p.29).  He also goes on to say how the field of psychology depends on this notion that people are often incorrect in their reasoning on why they behave and feel the way they do even though they wholeheartedly believe their explanation.  He maintains, “consciousness will only be understood by studying the unconscious processes that make it possible” (p.34). 

So this brings me to a question that fueled my curiosity to take this course.  The movements in psychology to help people change their cognition, the way they think, have helped many people with many different disorders.  From my understanding, 12 step  programs like Alcoholics Anonymous, are based on cognitive thinking. While some may briefly delve into their dynamic unconscious, 12 step programs are predominately dealing with the now and changing behavior. The same is true of some current psychologists who focus on cognitive behavior therapy, getting people to change their attitudes, believes, feelings and behavior by changing their thinking.

My question is, if emotions are based in the unconscious, having a direct physical effect on the human body (as LeDoux suggests and I agree), then how do these cognitive therapies actually work? Do they really get down to the heart of emotions, or is it a bandaid, covering up the underlying emotion and focusing on behavior? Is this enough and as effective to truly help people function in a more “positive” way?  LeDoux maintains that cognition does not effect the body as emotion does, so how can cognitive therapies not examine the unconscious given the fact that emotions effect the body so much? Are you training the brain to not be influenced by the emotion? It has been suggested to me that through cognition you are changing the neurochemical pathways in the brain, causing behavior change.  Is this true? What about the idea that cognition can spur on emotions, such as people with obsessive-compulsive disorder or post traumatic stress disorder.  There may an original trauma, but later there can be no immediate outside stimulus, but rather thinking that results in an emotional response.  So does cognition really not effect emotion? Is the term “cognition” being used in different ways here?

            The facial feedback on race bias article speaks to changing behavior in an unconscious way, opposite to the cognitive behavior therapist approach. Since emotion is connected is to a physical response, it is logical to me how this changes one’s emotion and consequently one’s behavior.  This got me thinking how many different approaches have the similar trait of unconscious influence on the body through repetition and “practice.”  This reminded me of what Lily was saying about the practice of yoga, and how Fulvio was talking about doing body work-these techniques can also induce behavior and/or emotional change, yet it is not totally conscious how this happens. Are all the techniques I’ve talked about basically reconditioning the brain, consciously or unconsciously?

The article “Pan-Cultural elements in Facial Displays of Emotion” made sense to me.  I found it easy to believe that people from different cultures could recognize and agree on the emotions shown on the faces of people.  It’s pretty amazing if you really think about how this appears to be universal. I do believe the reasons why people may feel different emotions is cultural and personal. When I was reading this article it also popped into my head how one may display an emotion on his or her face, but actually feel that they are presenting differently. The body can show an emotion but you are not consciously aware that you are exhibiting the emotion, which I think is pretty powerful.