I thought all of the readings for this week focused on a really interesting aspect of child development that is not often explored: the significant developments that allow for emotion. I thought that Lewis in particular had a lot of interesting things to say involving the emergence of consciousness, both of the self and of society. Lewis argues that this cognition is necessary to understand and produce complex emotions that we have discussed including guilt, love, jealousy, etc. The importance of cognitive evaluation (how he distinguished between emotional states and emotional experience) also seemed particularly relevant in cultural differences in emotion. He again discusses that case of the Japanese and comes to, I think, a very interesting and palpable conclusion: "It may be the case that Japanese children or adults may act in an angry way and may even have the emotional state of anger. However, since having such a state is inappropriate, they are not likely to have the emotional experience of anger" (p. 274). I think this theory probes deeper into the cultural realm than others have, and examines the abstract "display rules" in a developmentally and culturally significant way.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Development and Emotion
The Feeling Brain: Biology and Psychology of Emotion
Week 6: Development and Emotion
Aiden Bussey
To preface my post, I am not particularly interested in developmental psychology. However, some of the topics and theories covered in the reading were interesting to me.
One of the topics I found most interesting was Harris' discussion of narrative as a crucial component of emotional understanding and development. Narrative is an extremely important and intriguing phenomenon that penetrates not only the fields of psychology and neurobiology, but also philosophy, literature, anthropology and other seemingly unrelated disciplines. Further, narrative organization exists across a wide spectrum of ages and cultures, indicating that forming narratives is some sort of fundamental process for humans.
As our other readings have shown, emotion seems to penetrate evolution (non-human animals, including animals without elaborate linguistic systems seem to experience emotion in ways analogous to human experience) and various mental functions (such as reasoning). Thus, it makes sense that emotion would bare some significance in the formation and utilization of narrative.
The link between emotion and narrative to me seems to be related to the link between emotion and reasoning. Emotional contribution to reasoning seems to work primarily through giving value to memory. For instance, emotion allows neutral objects to be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant. This sort of memory requires an awareness of chronology and attribution of significance to the various components of a situation. This is directly related to narrative, which arrange connected events both in terms of chronology and significance.
Similarly, the early psychology of Freud was hugely driven by narrative forms. While much of Freud is no longer used today, he was nonetheless responsible for huge innovations in the field of psychology and many of his theories have an intuitive appeal that, while not necessarily supported by modern understandings of cognition, experience, or emotion, can nevertheless provide insight into the way that cognition, emotion, and experience are experienced. Narrative allows an individual both to situate events in time and space and to construct and arrange meanings. Often, narratives are employed to privilege the present, portraying the past as leading up to the present. This important in that it creates continuity in events that may be experienced as unrelated or senseless.
Week 6: Development and Emotion
Aiden Bussey
To preface my post, I am not particularly interested in developmental psychology. However, some of the topics and theories covered in the reading were interesting to me.
One of the topics I found most interesting was Harris' discussion of narrative as a crucial component of emotional understanding and development. Narrative is an extremely important and intriguing phenomenon that penetrates not only the fields of psychology and neurobiology, but also philosophy, literature, anthropology and other seemingly unrelated disciplines. Further, narrative organization exists across a wide spectrum of ages and cultures, indicating that forming narratives is some sort of fundamental process for humans.
As our other readings have shown, emotion seems to penetrate evolution (non-human animals, including animals without elaborate linguistic systems seem to experience emotion in ways analogous to human experience) and various mental functions (such as reasoning). Thus, it makes sense that emotion would bare some significance in the formation and utilization of narrative.
The link between emotion and narrative to me seems to be related to the link between emotion and reasoning. Emotional contribution to reasoning seems to work primarily through giving value to memory. For instance, emotion allows neutral objects to be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant. This sort of memory requires an awareness of chronology and attribution of significance to the various components of a situation. This is directly related to narrative, which arrange connected events both in terms of chronology and significance.
Similarly, the early psychology of Freud was hugely driven by narrative forms. While much of Freud is no longer used today, he was nonetheless responsible for huge innovations in the field of psychology and many of his theories have an intuitive appeal that, while not necessarily supported by modern understandings of cognition, experience, or emotion, can nevertheless provide insight into the way that cognition, emotion, and experience are experienced. Narrative allows an individual both to situate events in time and space and to construct and arrange meanings. Often, narratives are employed to privilege the present, portraying the past as leading up to the present. This important in that it creates continuity in events that may be experienced as unrelated or senseless.
Sunday, February 24, 2008
Week 6 Blog
Sylviane--Week 6
I found Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom’s article on social evaluation by preverbal infants to be very interesting, although it did stimulate quite a bit of doubt within me. I was particularly intrigued by the idea that “the capacity to evaluate individuals by their social actions may also serve as a foundation for a developing system of moral cognition.” At first I was a bit confused as to why the results of this study indicated the beginning of a moral system, for they seemed to reflect more punishment than morals. But I realized that the fact that the child reaches for the “helper’ or “neutral” party rather than the “harmful” party indicates some sort of approval of helping over inhibiting the third party, deeming one set of actions appropriate and the opposing set inappropriate. Another interesting part of this study was the conflicting data of the reaching and staring studies involving a neutral party; while infants reached for a neutral party over the hinder but for the helper over the neural party, this pattern was not reflected.
I did wonder, though, about the validity of the results and conclusions of this study because of both the methods and the population. I was surprised that wooden blocks with large eyes glued on were selected as the “characters” in this experiment. Because the face itself is so unique and a great deal of social information is conveyed through the eyes, it seems as if a more accurate representation would be necessary to truly evaluate an infant’s moral development. It seems unlikely that wooden blocks with eyes glued on would be able to adequately represent this. I am curious to see what would result if the study used blocks without eyes glued on, or blocks with images of actual faces glued on, although I do understand that using real faces would present a problem as well since “infants in the first half-year of life exhibit preferences for social individuals based on static perceptual features (for example, facial attractiveness, race).” The reaching behavior of the infant could possibly be influenced by the perceptual features of the face.
After reading this article, I read the chapters from The Handbook of Emotions and found the section on the development of emotional experiences in the chapter written by Lewis to be interesting. He writes, “Emotional experiences occur through the interpretation and evaluation of states, expressions, situations, behaviors of others, and beliefs about what ought to be happening. Emotional experiences are therefore dependent on cognitive processes.” He writes a bit later, after discussing infants inability to discriminate between facial patterns and have simultaneous comparisons, “This would suggest that infants are not capable of experiencing emotions prior to this point. Perhaps if I had read this article prior to Hamlin, Wynn, and Bloom’s article I would have agreed more with this point, but I did not. The article on social evaluation by preverbal infants provided very compelling evidence that evaluate the states, behaviors, and actions of others (they recognized that the third party was being helped or hindered and expressed either approval or disapproval of this) and have beliefs about what ought to be happening (they were surprised when the third party moved towards the hinderer). Although not every single one of the cognitive components Lewis has deemed “necessary” for experiencing an emotion are present, it seems as if it could be possible for infants to experience emotions. While I do agree with the fact that some emotions likely emerge before others, such as fear before shame since shame involves a more complex thought process (social norms, sense of self, disappointment), the emotional experience of infants should not be denied. The example of the woman who did not experience the state of fear she was in as her car slid off the road seems to reflect an attention issues; she was so preoccupied with handling the car she was not aware of the changes in her bodily state. Because infants can focus their attention, though, I do not think it is out of the question for an infant to “be in a state of pain or a state of fear, yet not experience that state.” Being very interested in the biological component of emotions, I wonder if Lewis’s ideas could be tested using some sort of brain imaging task.
Week 6
Sara Dholakia
I have to say, I truly wish I had read the the first two posts lasts, because I enjoyed them the least, and in fact, I would go as far as to say I was trudging through them. I believe that the last three articles on the list said both more eloquently and more succinctly, what the first two were trying to get across.
I didn't find that the first two articles presented much information that I was not already aware of, though I did appreciate that they both presented contrasting viewpoints.
Of the two models offered by Lewis on page 269, I find myself much more inclined toward the first, which asserts that the infant begins with a bio-polar state at birth, meaning the capacity for positive and negative emotions, so to speak, and that subsequent states emerge with the development of the brain and of the infant's interaction with others. This theory claims that specific emotions come about through differentiation of the positive and negative. I know that in class there has been quite a debate over whether emotions begin at the level of positive/negative, etc., and I believe that certain feelings can surely elicit both positive and negative emotions, but I believe that they all come about through differentiation and through development in cognition. For instance, Lewis presents the example of the fear of being caught cheating on a test; one would feel fear in this situation, but only after cognition took place and as a result of one's position in society.
The alternate model, the "discrete-systems model," argues that some states are preprogrammed and do not require further differentiation (269). Some of these states may not present themselves until certain development has occurred, however they are believed to exist.
I was really intrigued by the Harris article, specifically the sections dealing with the impact that emotionally charged conversations and those discussing emotion can have a positive effect on a child's emotional self-awareness. This seems perfectly reasonable, though I had never thought about it. The article shows that children from families that discuss emotion are later better able to define others' feelings, and they have a greater awareness of their own feelings. Moreover, conversation can provide children with a narrative format with which to organize the events of their daily lives (283). Harris does concede that some children may naturally be more empathic or more prone to try to discover others' feelings, however, the evidence provided is quite convincing.
In regards to the Hoffer article, I have to say that more than anything, it reminded me of Harry Harlow's experiments with macaques and the cloth mother. It might be interesting to discuss the extent to which a non-living construction can fill in for a real mother. Of course, a living, breathing caretaker is necessary for optimal development, but given the experiments provided by Hoffer, it would be interesting to get some opinions on the topic.
I have to say, I truly wish I had read the the first two posts lasts, because I enjoyed them the least, and in fact, I would go as far as to say I was trudging through them. I believe that the last three articles on the list said both more eloquently and more succinctly, what the first two were trying to get across.
I didn't find that the first two articles presented much information that I was not already aware of, though I did appreciate that they both presented contrasting viewpoints.
Of the two models offered by Lewis on page 269, I find myself much more inclined toward the first, which asserts that the infant begins with a bio-polar state at birth, meaning the capacity for positive and negative emotions, so to speak, and that subsequent states emerge with the development of the brain and of the infant's interaction with others. This theory claims that specific emotions come about through differentiation of the positive and negative. I know that in class there has been quite a debate over whether emotions begin at the level of positive/negative, etc., and I believe that certain feelings can surely elicit both positive and negative emotions, but I believe that they all come about through differentiation and through development in cognition. For instance, Lewis presents the example of the fear of being caught cheating on a test; one would feel fear in this situation, but only after cognition took place and as a result of one's position in society.
The alternate model, the "discrete-systems model," argues that some states are preprogrammed and do not require further differentiation (269). Some of these states may not present themselves until certain development has occurred, however they are believed to exist.
I was really intrigued by the Harris article, specifically the sections dealing with the impact that emotionally charged conversations and those discussing emotion can have a positive effect on a child's emotional self-awareness. This seems perfectly reasonable, though I had never thought about it. The article shows that children from families that discuss emotion are later better able to define others' feelings, and they have a greater awareness of their own feelings. Moreover, conversation can provide children with a narrative format with which to organize the events of their daily lives (283). Harris does concede that some children may naturally be more empathic or more prone to try to discover others' feelings, however, the evidence provided is quite convincing.
In regards to the Hoffer article, I have to say that more than anything, it reminded me of Harry Harlow's experiments with macaques and the cloth mother. It might be interesting to discuss the extent to which a non-living construction can fill in for a real mother. Of course, a living, breathing caretaker is necessary for optimal development, but given the experiments provided by Hoffer, it would be interesting to get some opinions on the topic.
Developing & Understanding Emotions
It is most interesting to try and understand our ever-evolving emotional life through the lens of a child’s cognitive developmental process. Michael Lewis’s account on The Emergence of Human Emotions and Paul L. Harris’s account on Understanding Emotions brings to our investigatory table some very interesting arguments, on which I would like to elaborate.
The emotional elicitor is argued to be either a learned function of how to behave or a natural process whereby specific events elicit specific emotions. A problematic one would encounter with trying to define an emotional elicitor, is the difficulty of trying to determine which stimuli is an emotional trigger. Can there ever be a satisfactory definition for the interplay of external/internal world of emotions without generalizing? The idea that the same emotion can be provoked by different elicitors and that different emotions can be triggered by the same elicitor; is it not a generalization of something very individually determined? Further the dilemma is raised weather an emotional elicitor is internal or external, the state or the experience, the everlasting dilemma of body versus mind. This I think is only solvable by accepting the view that each enhances and influences the other. Biologically determined and also learned in the very beginning of life, in other words, cognition as mediator of elicitors. He moves forth to determine specific emotional states: The ‘non-state’ theory is most interesting to me, the common idea that ‘its all in our head’ and that generally emotions are a consequence of thought. Then the idea that we develop the emotion through appraising it should make one question our appraisal tool - language. Is the word we have acquired for the feeling broad enough to express all its different states? (E.g. love can be experienced so differently and yet it is the same word we use to describe: maternal, paternal, romantic etc.) The other view, since Darwin, is that of a specific emotional states which then must correspond with the body; the interaction between specific emotions and the felt experience with the correspondent body is necessary; And it is true I believe that we store our emotional weight in the body. As I understand it we need to be able to verbalize the experience, to understand the general or specific emotional state one undergoes.
If the infant has not yet acquired language to express the ‘I’ experience of a certain emotional elicitor or an emotional state, does it mean the actual experience is lesser or non-existent? For example In the experiment conducted on ‘Social evaluation by preverbal infants’ that measured the ability of the child to engage in complex social situation as a third ‘objective’ party, with only 6-10 month old infants, the findings show that early on we evolve social empathetic feelings. Lewis would have argued that infants do not even experience emotions prior to 7-8 month. Lewis raises the complex idea that an emotional state can be experienced without consciously experiencing it. How can an individual ‘experience’ anger without experiencing it? As noted in psychotherapy these states can be brought about to consciousness, but I want to ask, where do these emotions go? Where is the subconscious storing them? And how come they can be brought about from unconscious to consciousness? The idea that a child is simply not feeling ‘self-conscious evaluative emotions’ because its sense of self in the face of the world is not yet evolved, seems different then the subconscious emotions experienced by adults, but I wonder if it really is? As Darwin said these unique emotions are what makes us human; is the infant then not fully a human until three years of age? As said that by the age of 3 years our emotions become differentiated, an elaborate and complex system of emotions will have evolved. (But don’t the bipolar infant state follow us throughout our life? Aren’t the emotions most intensely felt when in one extreme or the other?) Once we are capable of self-analyzing our emotional state, certain emotions which would be a result of an external social stimuli, are still not physically felt. Therefore I wonder does the protection mechanism in our body stop the chemical reaction that occurs in the brain from affecting the body, or the less likely option that there is no response at all?
I do agree, “…the most likely explanation of emotional development is the differentiation of emotion state which occur as a function of maturation, socialization, and cognitive development” (Lewis). Yet it is a very tricky approach as in early childhood the basic emotions seem to be felt most purely by the developing human—without the social construct of appropriation—these seem to be the innate features on the basis of which the learned script of emotions develops. Yet we have no concrete internal data to determine weather our external evaluations are correct, or vice versa.
In Paul L. Harris’s account we move form the development of emotion to the coherent understanding of emotion, the child moves from differentiation to the appraisal of his/her emotional life. It is indeed due to our specialty in language that differentiates us from other primates, as we can put our feelings into words. As said can words ever be sufficient to express the emotional experience? It is through children that we can assess most precisely how the emotion is affected by developing cognition, as it is assumed that although they begin to put their feelings into words it is not done in a self-conscious manner as evaluative adults would. Then indeed the question arises as Harris asks: ‘to what extent are children able to offer not just a report but an accurate report of emotions?’ With the rise in vocabulary and understanding of the self in relation to the other, children begin to be able to assess their own emotions and others, in social situations with peers and family (ages 3-5). It is important to remember the individual as a measure of emotion, because some children may naturally be more empathetic then others. Moreover is it interesting to me that the familial discussion and openness about felt emotions and why one is feeling such emotions, will affect the ability of the child to appropriate social interactions. Language, which enables the child to formulate a narrative of the emotional life, makes it possible to discuss and share emotionally charged experiences. Yet I feel words can sometimes also confine us to the ‘script’ of feelings we are taught to express, and I wonder if it is at all possible to understand feelings without words? Like the example of understanding what people feel without talking to them, but merely through observation of facial expressions and body language. I think one can get to the core of very true feelings more so then often times with words as intermediaries. This is because language and cognition enable us to deceive, and how often do we recon someone is feeling quite differently then what they express in words. On the other hand conversation about emotions can be a positive sharing of attitudes, and hopefully can make sense of the appraisal processes that underpin it. Children with high emotional intelligence and verbal ability might understand the specific appraisal process relevant in a certain emotional states. The other side argues that children might be more sensitive to the non-verbal signals, and can detect a fake smile from a genuine one or a look of surprise from fear. The finding that emotional expression is related to popularity makes total sense here. Further early on and universally children can understand that the emotional reaction with its intensity is in reaction to an immediate situation; nevertheless is the power of the mind and memory capable to recreate emotions. This is an overwhelming discovery in ones own mental assessment. As mentioned by Harris, the script concept reveals a conceptual difficulty that the same situation can elicit different emotions (just as Lewis notes about the correlation of elicitor and emotional state) this script is argued to begin with an inherently psychological event, of a person appraising a situation. In children it is argued, they realize early on that it is in the match of goals and desires with the expected outcome that triggers strong emotions. Later on they begin to formulate the actuality of their beliefs and expectations as emotional stimulators. And as concluded, children’s developing understanding of the process of emotions, is an epiphenomenon!
I feel as though we are in a vicious circle with the ever determining questions such as: are the emotions innate or part of our natural developmental process as human beings; if it is the latter, is it maturational or interactive? I think that our lexicon of words is to banal to express the internal complexities of our emotions. If the emotional experiences occur on different conscious levels, what if there are such deep emotions that we cannot feel because we have no name for them hence no experience of their existence and so we never understand them consciously?
The idea that infants are not capable of experiencing emotions up to a certain point brings up many questions. Would abortion be seen in a different light if there were a certainty that the fetus did not feel a thing? And how come the emotional state of a mother during her pregnancy can affect the child’s future character? How come there are studies that show that in our infancy, in the attachment period, our basic trust in people is evolved; As well as many other subconscious developments in our emotional world that will accompany us throughout our life? There must be a distinction between the experience of an emotion and the rationalization of it. Even when we do not understand we have hunches within us that will make us curious to understand the ‘I’ experience in the first place, then when we have learned words to express our states of being it still seems insufficient and self disguisable.
AAI
This week’s reading was so incredibly dense that it is hard to decide on a focus or specific place to start for a discussion. I feel like these readings could produce weeks of discussion and topics! I have decided to look at the AAI used in both Seigel and Harris. My understanding is that the Adult Attachment Interview is an interview given to adults to understand the attachment they had to their parents in early childhood. It is fascinating to me that this could so clearly predict the attachment the child of these parents will have to them and what this says about the child’s emotional development.
According to Harris, the “coherence and degree of reflection with which a child’s mother talked about her own attachment was a predictor of later performance by her child on the assessment of emotion understanding.” (pg. 284) Harris also states that the children were tested on situations to the extent in which they could provoke a mixture of positive and negative feelings.
Harris then offers two interpretations of this AAI study. The first is according to attachment theory and says that the mother’s coherence and sensitivity will help in secure attachment with the child that will then foster the child’s understanding of emotion. The second interpretation is based in the theory that family talk about emotion will facilitate a child’s open expression, communication and acknowledgment of emtotion. (284)
It seems to me that these two can co-exist and actually fit together quite nicely. It would seem that a caregiver who has a coherence and sensitivity in regards to emotion will be more capable of and more likely to talk to their child about emotion. Also, understanding and being more comfortable with emotional expression themselves, it seems not too far fetched to say that they would be better able to interperate and understand the childs non-verbal expression of emotion and be more responsive to that. This responsivity seems to me to be a form of non-verbal talk. So, with a caregiver who has a more cohesive sense of emotion, there would be both more “talk” and more secure attachment. With this secure attachment and better emotional understanding, this child is more likely to have a secure attachment with their future children. It seems to be a continuing cycle.
This brings us to the Siegal article on several points. First, verbal or non-verbal “talk” could be seen as the “collaborative interpersonal interaction” that Siegal mentions as the key to healthy development (Siegal, 72). It is this interpersonal connection, found in secure attachment, that the circuits regulating emotional and social functioning are ingrained. Development is about the creation of specific circuits. (73) So it follows that interpersonal relationships are key to development.
Second, Siegal also discusses the transfer of trauma across generations (88). Integration is key in all respects to Siegals understanding of emotion and emotional experience. He suggests here that psychotherapeutic interventions would promote neural integration and promote better self-regulation and a coherent self-understanding. AAI, it seems, could be said as testing for internal integration.
Following from all of this it seems that attachment theories and talk theories do not contradict one another but are pieces of the larger answer.
Question:
Have any of the topics in this weeks reading addressed parents that are not biological? Has the AAI test been given to caregives who are not biological parents for example?
It seems to me that this would tell us a good deal about how emotions develop. Could it be that past traumatic responses in our genetic histories affect the way we develop emotion or is it totally a result of our social interactions with our parents.
This weeks readings also address the development of some attachments before birth, such as a mothers smell. Does it cause emotional stress for the child to be separated from this prenatal connection? Then the Hamlin reading addresses the elements of what may cause distress at the separation of mother and child. It seems that many of the elements mentioned in the Hamilin reading would not be problematic with a parent who adopted but the prenatal attachments could cause problems.
According to Harris, the “coherence and degree of reflection with which a child’s mother talked about her own attachment was a predictor of later performance by her child on the assessment of emotion understanding.” (pg. 284) Harris also states that the children were tested on situations to the extent in which they could provoke a mixture of positive and negative feelings.
Harris then offers two interpretations of this AAI study. The first is according to attachment theory and says that the mother’s coherence and sensitivity will help in secure attachment with the child that will then foster the child’s understanding of emotion. The second interpretation is based in the theory that family talk about emotion will facilitate a child’s open expression, communication and acknowledgment of emtotion. (284)
It seems to me that these two can co-exist and actually fit together quite nicely. It would seem that a caregiver who has a coherence and sensitivity in regards to emotion will be more capable of and more likely to talk to their child about emotion. Also, understanding and being more comfortable with emotional expression themselves, it seems not too far fetched to say that they would be better able to interperate and understand the childs non-verbal expression of emotion and be more responsive to that. This responsivity seems to me to be a form of non-verbal talk. So, with a caregiver who has a more cohesive sense of emotion, there would be both more “talk” and more secure attachment. With this secure attachment and better emotional understanding, this child is more likely to have a secure attachment with their future children. It seems to be a continuing cycle.
This brings us to the Siegal article on several points. First, verbal or non-verbal “talk” could be seen as the “collaborative interpersonal interaction” that Siegal mentions as the key to healthy development (Siegal, 72). It is this interpersonal connection, found in secure attachment, that the circuits regulating emotional and social functioning are ingrained. Development is about the creation of specific circuits. (73) So it follows that interpersonal relationships are key to development.
Second, Siegal also discusses the transfer of trauma across generations (88). Integration is key in all respects to Siegals understanding of emotion and emotional experience. He suggests here that psychotherapeutic interventions would promote neural integration and promote better self-regulation and a coherent self-understanding. AAI, it seems, could be said as testing for internal integration.
Following from all of this it seems that attachment theories and talk theories do not contradict one another but are pieces of the larger answer.
Question:
Have any of the topics in this weeks reading addressed parents that are not biological? Has the AAI test been given to caregives who are not biological parents for example?
It seems to me that this would tell us a good deal about how emotions develop. Could it be that past traumatic responses in our genetic histories affect the way we develop emotion or is it totally a result of our social interactions with our parents.
This weeks readings also address the development of some attachments before birth, such as a mothers smell. Does it cause emotional stress for the child to be separated from this prenatal connection? Then the Hamlin reading addresses the elements of what may cause distress at the separation of mother and child. It seems that many of the elements mentioned in the Hamilin reading would not be problematic with a parent who adopted but the prenatal attachments could cause problems.
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