Suzanne Ardanowski
2-22-08
Feeling Brain
The Lewis article raised some questions for me. To think this through, let me put down on paper his ideas on emotional states first. Emotional states are “particular constellations of changes in somatic and/or neurophysiological activity” (267). Changes in body, face, voice, hormones occur which one may or may not be able to perceive. He sites Elkman and says that while some have argued for correspondence between internal states and emotion, proof of specific states tied to specific emotions is lacking, with the exception of some bodily and facial expression (p.268). There are then the cognitive nonstate theorists, who believe emotions are a result of thinking. The fear response is given as an example of a specific state, elicited by a certain stimulus. Shame is an example of cognitive processing resulting in an emotion. My first question is then when he says “cognitive” does he necessarily mean conscious? Lewis states, “it may be quite possible to have a specific emotional state but to be unaware of it, ignore it, or even deny it” (p.268). In saying this is he saying unconscious emotions only occur in emotional states, and not cognitively? The cognitive emotions seem to be more complex-such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, envy, pride. Is he suggesting these “cognitive emotions” can never be unconscious? Psychoanalytic theory would say otherwise.
He does address psychoanalytic theory, discussing unconscious functions, and how conscious perceptions of experiences can be unavailable. However, this is dependent on the experience of an internal state (p.273). Is the unconscious therefore linked to neurophysiological activity? Freud had wanted to prove this. Cognitively speaking, states are really cognitive constructions of experience, past history, and the responses of others. While I believe in the power of cognition, I have a hard time separating unconscious influences from cognitive experience. Though I did think the passage on the spinal injury patients was fascinating. Without access to a neurophysiological state they were able to have a sexual experience-giving strength to the argument of cognition and the ability of the human brain to use past knowledge to construct an experience. But is sexual experience the same as emotional? They could overlap, but not necessarily….I guess it depends on your definition of emotional experience.
The experience of emotion is said to “require that the organism posses some fundamental cognitive abilities, including the ability to perceive and discriminate, recall, associate, and compare. Emotional experiences also require a particular cognitive ability-that is the development of a concept of self” (p.273). So, does that mean that animals and babies do not have emotional experiences? It is stated that prior to 7 or 8 months of age infants are not capable of experiencing emotions. This I cannot agree with. I don’t see how the definition of emotional experience needs to be tied to the cognitive ability of attending to the self, and in fact how are we measuring a sense of self? Infants have a state of oneness with their mother (in Western culture at least), but does that mean you cannot have an emotional experience in this state? There has been plenty of infant research, including studies on attachment, which give much argument to the emotional life of infants, including newborns and even prenatal. Lewis goes on to say that infants maybe can “be in a particular emotional state and yet not experience it” (p.274). The argument for this is the comparison to the woman whose tire blows and does not experience her emotional state of fear. This is comparing apples to oranges. To me, the woman is unconsciously utilizing her defense mechanisms (in this case perhaps depnial of fear) for survival. She also may feel the fear after she gets out of the car, when she is no longer in danger. I think it is too narrow a definition to say that an emotional state must be accompanied by self-awareness, but I can see why one would suggest this. However, the exclusion of young infants and animals does not seem right. How can we truly know whether someone has a sense of self? 15 months is given as the age of being able to “make reference to the self as having that state” (p.274). So before this infants are unaware of what they are experiencing? What about in cultures where self awareness is not valued? Is this part of their definition of experiencing emotion?
The Hofer article addresses the attachment bond between a mother and child, which to me is an emotional experience, despite the symbiotic relationship. It is argued in psychoanalytical theory to have lasting (even lifetime) effects on behavior, personality, and experience. The regulatory process of the mother-infant interaction and the impact of this interaction on later play and social interactions is something we have also been leaning about in the Play and Culture class. The Harris article states that as soon as children are able to talk, they begin to project feelings onto nonhuman objects, which is also a huge component of play and one of the foundations of play therapy. Narratives as Harris suggests are also essential for understanding emotion for children, and for adults, which give credit to the powerful effects of talk therapy.
The social evaluations of the infants in the Hamlin et al article, who had “a liking for those who act cooperatively to facilitate the goals of others” (p.558) parallels the relationship between an infant and his/her mother. A child’s appraisal of a situation is also discussed in the Harris article. I think subtle cues are essential to a child’s appraisal. I remember once I was having a heavy discussion with my brother in front of my five year old niece. We were both remaining calm but there must have been a tone to our voices that my niece picked up on because she kept running back and forth between me and my brother, giving us each hugs. I didn’t realize she was even doing that until later on, and I realized how comprehension is not always essential to appraising a situation. I also thought it was interesting in the Lewis article how he notes that we are more likely to believe as adults that certain expressions are tied to certain emotions depending on the context. He gives the example of saying a child is expressing fear when a stranger approaches, yet if a child expresses the same face when sitting next to his/her mother we will call the expression something else given the context. We see what we want to see.
3 comments:
Suzanne summed up many of my concerns with the Lewis reading. I feel conflicted about Lewis’ definition of experience and the way that consciousness and cognition relate to that experience. Perhaps I just do not like the use of the word “experience” because to say that infants do not experience emotion seems to diminish the importance of the early attachment experiences.
I wonder how Lewis reconciles his argument with attachment theory. I also wonder how is argument would apply to mentally incapacitated people who may fail cognitive task and may lack a fully developed sense of self. Yet, might they experience emotion despite cognitive structures? Do we need the organizing powers of cognition in order to experience emotion, as Lewi defines it? Also, might they be able to convey emotional experience through means other than language. How might a person who lacked language still be able to organize their emotions and have “emotional experiences”? Here I wonder how arts therapy may be capable of showing things that language-based psychotherapy is not.
I think that the discussion of the emergence and recognition of self in relation to a child's ability to experience emotion involves several factors. I agree that Lewis diminishes the importance of the non-verbal, symbolic emotional language that exists between a mother a child described by Siegel, because I think it's this non-verbal dialogue and connection that enables the child to begin to communicate. At the same time, though, he does allude to various factors that may affect our understanding of emotions in infants. He refers to the fact that the recognition of emotions in young children is often dependent upon culture - he gives the example of anger, that some cultures such as the Japanese may recognize it in their children at different ages due to what is seen or expected. He also brings up the fact that the study of emotions is an obviously difficult task because infants do not express the linguistic capability. It seems to me that he is saying, on one hand, that without language and the ability to refer to oneself as undergoing an experience, that the emotion exists but is not as valid because the infant is not aware? He says that certain emotions such as empathy and embarassment are dependent upon an awareness of self, but what of the more primary emotions?
Harris discusses the foundation of emotional expression and experience in the family and how a child's construction of situations and events is often determined by how the parents speak to their children about their own emotional experiences. If the parent defines a child's experience for him because he does not possess the linguistic or cognitive skills to do so himself, this could influence the way in which the child recognizes and makes sense of his feelings when he eventually does have the linguistic capacity. Another interesting point Harris makes is the notion of scripts for various emotions, that children come to identify an emotion based upon observation of how others react and express certain feelings in certain situations. Therefore, these situations and scripts will differ across culture. In this sense as well, it's important to consider how the cultural environment influences our recognition of emotional experience in the development process.
I think it is interesting to look at Freud in context of these readings, not only in the vein of the unconscious but also the idea of the narrative self. In this sense, the Freudian concept of the "talking cure" could relate to our autobiographical definition of self; the narrative explanations we give that help to create our self-concept. From a developmental standpoint this narrative self that Siegal talks about is important to also to concepts of the unconscious and how they are manifested in our ability to form a representation of ourselves socially and individually. This also ties in to the social aspects of development which can be negatively or positively affected by nature and nurture aspects of a child's development. I think a very important part of these readings that I came away with anyway was a distinction between the sense of self and the ability to experience emotion. It seems as though one could make the argument that a fully developed social awareness does not negate emotional awareness. So, even though infants do not have the language to express emotion they are able to recognize it.
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