Suzanne Ardanowski
Feeling Brain
4-11-08
Whose life would you save? Those moral questions were always so impossible to answer. I can follow the logic of moral judgments occurring on a neuronal level, but I think Zimmer is a little confusing/misleading when he states “if right and wrong are nothing more than the instinctive firing of neurons, why bother being good?” (p.5). He then goes on to say, “by the time we become adults, we’re wired with emotional responses that guide our judgments for the rest of our lives” (p.5). This statement sounds like the pathways are a result of learned behavior. Maybe he was referring to the firing as instinctual, but saying “nothing more than” is confusing to me. It is more, a lot more, as he recognizes when he discusses genes, culture, and personal experience. Furthermore, it is possible to change these pathways. The firing may be instinctual, but the pathway isn’t.
While we may wish for the decision making process to be “understood in terms of unitary evaluative and decision making systems” (Sanfey et al, p.111) as the economic approach suggests, I think this is a tall order for the subjective, multifaceted human experience. I think science, and people in general, want a clear definitive answer, with clearly predictable and measurable results. Sanfey et al also speak to the “assumption of optimality” and desire for formal theory (p109). They question the possibility of a single system, noting how different systems can compete, causing different disposition toward the same information (p.111). The descriptions of System 1 (automatic) and System 2 (controlled) reminded me of Ledoux’s low road/high road comparison. It is amazing how much of our functioning is the combination of the unconscious/automatic and the conscious/cognitive. We have discussed this theme a lot. I think we often tend to minimize the intuitive System 1 in favor of the mighty System 2, because as a culture we devalue things we cannot measure. But haven’t we all had those times when we say, “I knew it, but I didn’t say it, do it…etc.” I think you can become more in tune with System 1 if you give it more value. It makes sense to me that “strategic interactions between individuals involves an interplay between emotion and deliberation” (p.113). It makes me think of the cartoon angel/devil on your shoulder.
Speaking of consciousness, the Bechara et al article states, “pure cognitive processes unassisted by emotional signals do not guarantee normal behavior in the face of adequate knowledge” (p.160). I think this is strong support for my value of System 1.
I remember learning about the Kohlberg moral reasoning scale last semester. We spoke a lot about how biased this scale was, and how it valued certain kinds of reasoning while not even considering others. So I am not convinced that it is a good measure of moral judgment. I thought it was really interesting that despite having preserved IQ and cognitive function, and abstract social knowledge, patients with prefrontal damage had “disastrous real life judgment” (Greene & Haidt p.518). The whole idea of emotions influencing moral judgment makes sense. It makes me wonder if there is “no specifically moral part of the brain” (Green & Haidt p.522) than is it possible to really be objective? When we give advice, are on a jury, work with children and families, can we ever truly be impartial? I don’t think so, even if we think we are.
I am also curious if antipsychotic drugs are targeting the areas discussed in the Green & Haidt article and would like to know if drug treatment can improve moral behavior.
2 comments:
These readings made me think of a lot of different things that I'm not sure I fully understand. First, whenever I think of Neuroeconomics I remember an article I read for Marvin Frankel's lecture about how companies market groceries on different levels. This was an example of manipulating a consumer before they even have a chance to make a decision they might not normally make. Children's food is at eye level for children, some people tend to look at different shelves, or sides of the supermarket.
This then made me think of a conversation I had about the death penalty, something I am sure everyone has heard. The theory that if you agree with the death penalty then could you pull the trigger yourself? I'm not sure if the question is why we do the things we do, but more so what gets us to that place before we do them.
I think this applies to Zimmer's paper. And I agree, it is confusing to say why bother being good. Okay, then why does a large percent of the society innately make the 'right' decision?
I think its interesting that some of the studies were based on gambling, because isn't the decision to gamble in the first place the 'wrong' one? Why not ask why people walk on certain sides of the street, or why we always start our step with a certain foot, or what order we put on our clothes? Maybe those things just have to do more with the automatic then anything. The decisions that Zimmer is talking about, are decisions that take real thought.
I thought the Greene and Haidt article brought up an interesting point about agency. When they were describing the trolley scenario they made a distinction between the personal and the impersonal. So, even if both of the outcomes involve one life being sacrificed for multiple other lives the act of physically being involved is what makes dilemma that much more of a moral one. Then, could it be argued that removing a sense of agency makes it easier for us to do immoral things? This is also interesting to think about it relation to how automatic our judgments can be and then what goes on in between the immediate judgment and the ultimate decision. Specifically in a situation where a decision must be made quickly, if the automatic response that we have isn't the stereotypically moral response how much longer might we process it in order to justify our choice or change the way we think about it in order to do the right thing.
Post a Comment