Tessa Noonan
3/9/08
I really liked the way that both McGaugh and LeDoux described the process of memory and its heavily emotional mechanisms. McGaugh says “we must acknowledge that remembering is a creative act that accesses and uses much more than, as well as much less than, the information originally stored” (p. 118). Although this seems a little confusing and contradictory, I think McGaugh’s point follows the integrative and thus often unreliable aspects of memory production and recall that factor into the way we remember a particular event.
Of course, this becomes particularly relevant in studies and cases that both authors cited in which adults are made to relive false past experiences of child abuse, for example, the memories of which have been “repressed.” I was interested in the diverging ways McGaugh and LeDoux describe this phenomenon, and the entire Freudian conception of repression in itself. McGaugh comes down very hard on this idea, stating that there is absolutely no scientific basis for “repression” in any form, and that emotionally significant memories cannot just be recovered from this phase. LeDoux, on the other hand, grants this theory scientific validity on the grounds of “hypermesia” (p. 245). Is there a way to isolate these differences into a coherent frame of reference, or is there too little known about this phenomenon to concretely know whether or not repression can take place?
On another note, I thought LeDoux’s description of phobias and anxiety in the form of fear conditioning was extremely helpful in understanding both memory processes and fear conditioning that LeDoux primarily studies. This synthesis proved very useful in describing and beginning to understand panic attacks, phobias, and disorders such as PTSD. Particularly interesting to me was the inherent connection that we’ve seen countless times between the Schacter and Singer findings of interpretive evaluation and the fear reaction that becomes conditioned via bodily response. As in Wolpe’s conditioning theory of panic, the primarily stimulus reaction takes place on an internal level, which is then attributed to an external stimuli that becomes the conditioned fear stimuli. Combining our analysis of the amygdala from last week, and the emotionally salient and indiscriminate response from the “low road” through the amygdala, it is quite easy (and fascinating) to see how someone experiencing PTSD symptoms might mistake a slamming door for a gunshot, just like someone else might mistake a tree branch for a snake.
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As I am studying PTSD for conference, I've found a multitude of articles that when discussing PTSD, refer to the fear conditioning aspect of it; I find this interesting because though I had not really thought about it in this way, that is in some small part what PTSD is (hyperactive PTSD, as opposed to dissociative).In this way, after going through a certain scenario enough times in one's head such as a battle scene or an instance of abuse, some aspects such as sound or different sights could most definitely trigger a fearful reaction.
I also found McGaugh's suggestion of memory as a "creative act" very intriguing. Even though it is most easily understood and relevant in terms of those who have been persuaded of false memory, it is interesting simply to think about in the process of memory recall in our every day lives. Especially in terms of the construction of narratives, it is true that the moment we begin to define experiences with languages, the moment those experiences are altered. It is incredibly interesting to observe how children often create their own memories of events, because even though their narratives tend to be elaborate, it reflects the way in which one naturally constructs memory. Inevitably, each time an event is communicated, the event somehow becomes changed. Repetition often renders the event further away from truth, as McGaugh notes, even though to begin with, the "truth" is subjective. Even the first moment at which a memory is recalled, or the first time it is perceived as having happened, it is influenced by the context and situation in which one recollects.
Both points raised here, on repression as well as on PTSD are very interesting, and seem to indicate that our understanding of neurobiological concepts now allows us to take the step over to more general concepts of psychology with which we may be a bit more comfortable. I was also struck by McGaugh's outright rejection of the concept of repression. It seems that his own research would support the idea that long-term, heavily-laden emotional memories could be consolidated for many years without conscious awareness. Although the concept may be flawed, especially in the way that Freud framed the mechanism of repression, it seems that it is an important phenomenon to consider in the light of neurobiological evidence. LeDoux gives more credence to the theory of repression, presumably because it fits well with his ideas about fear conditioning and the ability of the brain to generalize fear responses.
PTSD is interesting for LeDoux because it points to the fact that while our complex fear conditioning centers are evolutionarily beneficial, and memories indeed should not all be treated equal, the complex ability of our brains to generalize emotional responses to stimuli can turn against us.
Aiden Bussey
One of the things I found interesting about McGaugh was his response to/analysis of his friend's request for a pill to enhance memory. Where much of McGaugh's writing is thoughtful and nuanced, this framework for his discussion fell somewhat short. McGaugh very much takes the mothers request at quite literal face value -- when he later discusses his strychnine experiments in rats, a major conern (and a concern that pervades all experimental sciences)was what the observed phenomenon (improved performance on a maze task) could be understood to represent (improved memory vs. improved alertness vs. improved vision). McGaugh goes on to discuss the naturally enhanced (for lack of a better concise term) quality of emotionally significant memories. And, while I understand his topic (and book title) is Memory and Emotion and this discussion is very appropriate for his book, it is rather unrelated to his introductory anecdote. While the mother asked for a memory enhancing drug, it seems unlikely she wanted the drug so that her child would remember what he had for lunch the Thursday two weeks previous or even a particularly emotional fight or a marriage proposal. It seems very likely her purpose was performance enhancement, specifically academic performance enhancement, and to this end increased alertness, focused attention, or improved memory all become essentially interchangeable. The motive behind the request is not, as McGaugh frames it, improved memory per se, but improved performance (and from that, hypothetically, improved status, opportunity, happiness, etc., etc., etc.). The only type of memory which really needs to be enhanced for this (it seems to me) is semantic memory -- the ability to recall facts or information, but not necessarily their contexts.
On a more topical note, one of the things I found interesting about the topic of fear conditioning and memory in LeDoux was the pervasive but rather under-discussed link between emotion and feelings or sensations (such as pain or the satisfaction of food) that we understand as more purely or essentially physical. Similarly, last week's discussion of emotional development seems to point to initial emotions (distress and contentment) the correspond to pain and satisfaction and only later differentiate to the myriad range of emotions we observe and experience as adults. In the concept of preparedness, however, it does seem that there is some seprability between emotion (fear) and sensation (pain). My understanding of LeDoux's discussion of Watson's experiments with rats leads me to believe that the rats feared their "perennial enemy," the cat, before the cat had actually harmed or attacked them. In this case, it wold ertainly seem that (at least in some cases) emotion is not dependent on or informed by sensation, but bears its own innate preferences and programming.
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