The Feeling Brain
4/30/08
Having done quite a bit of research on social consciousness, particularly on mirror neurons in relation to autism, I found the back and forth dialogue between the articles to be very interesting. In particular, the different ways in which the authors conceived of self-consciousness in relation to the social world. Frith and Frith (2007) end their paper with a suggestion that "awareness of the self might be more accurately described as awareness of the self as others see us" (p. R730). This idea clearly incorporates strong influences of social signals, as discussed in the paper, and social feedback; the link between social signals and individual consciousness is invaluable here.
Ramachandran makes a similar evolutionary argument, putting mirror neurons at the forefront of much cognitive development for humans. However, he does bring up an example which seems to reverse the directionality the the Friths propose: in relation to anosognosia patients, Ramachandran supposes that in order to make a judgement about another's movements you must be able to virtually simulate the corresponding movement within your own body and brain. Because people with anosognosia deny their own paralysis, they also subsequently deny the paralysis of others as well. Although mirror neurons still establish a connection between two individuals by assessing the likeness of their situations, Ramachandran's theory originates with the central subject, as opposed to the social world.
I also found Eisenberger and Lieberman's article on physical and social pain to be fascinating in its results and its implications. Not only do physical and social pain overlap in their brain processes, but they can in fact complement or supplement each other. Eisenberger and Lieberman claim that enhanced sensitivity for one type of pain accompanies a similar enhanced sensitivity for the other type, but also that increased social support decreases both social and physical pain (chronic ailments, during cancer, following heart surgery, and during childbirth). Again, the idea that input from the social world can so drastically change our consciousness, even of something so seemingly basic as the pain levels within our own bodies, is truly amazing.
These ideas began applying themselves in Adolphs article, as he was discussing a woman who had suffered damage to her amygdala and could not properly identify emotions in faces, particularly fear. The experimenters isolated the eyes as the area with which she had the most difficulty, because she did not spend time looking at them. I first wondered if the damage to her amygdala prohibited her from forging emotional connections with others because she had a lowered susceptibility to emotions herself, and thus could not even identify them on another's face. However, once the experimenters told her to look at the eyes of the face, she could easily identify fear, meaning that she had some internal guide for what fear looked like. This example brings up many perplexing questions, including whether or not the amygdala gives us certain proclivities for finding and addressing emotion within the social world, so we are still able to "feel" it to some extent. Adolphs of course also addressed the question of autism, and whether there are similar issues behind the inability to make eye contact and thus lack of emotional identification. The fact that other areas of the brain can compensate for certain disadvantages is certainly incredible as well, and another example of its ability to evolve and adapt.
1 comment:
Tessa writes in reference to the Eisenberger/Lierberman article, “…the idea that input from the social world can so drastically change our consciousness, even of something so seemingly basic as the pain levels within our own bodies, is truly amazing.” I agree and marvel at the applications of this notion and the reverse: that our physical pain tolerance can contribute to a higher threshold for emotional pain. What comes immediately to mind is the heavy physical training of soldiers when preparing for combat. They are not only preparing for the strains and potential injuries of battle, but for the emotional stresses of leaving their homes and injuring and/or killing others. I also think of the prevalence of “cutting” in troubled teens. To cope with heavy emotional trauma, some teenagers are drawn to cutting themselves. I wonder if this is their intrinsic desire to “harden” themselves against more emotional devastation. Jilted lovers, too, often share this urge to do themselves damage upon a messy break-up. Is this to externalize/express their pain or an attempt, like the teens, to increase their physical pain tolerance and thus their emotional pain tolerance?
On a less painful note, the Frith and Frith article piqued my interest a lot, especially the “go-nogo” studies. When both participants are given conflicting instruction, their actions comingled and took longer to ensue. This reminds me of the childhood task to “rub your belly, pat your head.” Could our brain hemispheres also lag because of an internal “action selection conflict?” As a musician, I’ve always wondered at the cognitive ability of drummers to perform 4 different actions with their hands and feet (some being able to sing as well). I sing while playing guitar and just coordinating two hands and a voice can be a cognitive ordeal! Through practice, though, I come to understand the disparate movements as one whole maneuver; increasing the fluidity and decreasing the brain lag of my performance. Is this how dancers coordinate the choreography of a piece with other dancers--by envisioning everyone’s movement as one fluid gesture?
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